Gulf Power Rivalry Fuels RSF Threat to El Obeid, Deepening Sudan’s War and Regional Stakes
A new analysis says intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman and the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed is undermining peace efforts in Sudan as RSF forces prepare an assault on the key city of El Obeid. The power struggle between Gulf patrons risks turning Sudan’s internal war into a proxy contest, with civilians trapped in El Obeid and surrounding states facing a more fragmented, unaccountable conflict. Readers will learn how external competition is shaping Sudan’s battlefield and peace talks.
Sudan’s war is no longer only about Khartoum’s generals and Darfur’s militias. It is increasingly becoming a contest shaped in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. A detailed report released on 26 June argues that growing rivalry between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan has hardened positions on the ground just as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) prepare for an assault on the strategic city of El Obeid.
The analysis contends that the once-coordinated “Quartet” of external actors—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United States and the United Kingdom—has lost coherence as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi diverge in their approaches to Sudan’s warring factions. The report says that this split has weakened attempts to broker a durable ceasefire and emboldened the RSF, which is poised to move on El Obeid, a key hub between Khartoum, Darfur, and Sudan’s south.
For civilians in and around El Obeid, the implications are stark. The city sits astride important road networks and has served as a lifeline for displaced people and trade during previous rounds of fighting. An RSF offensive could cut off humanitarian corridors, intensify urban combat, and expose residents to the kind of looting, arbitrary violence, and ethnic targeting that have been reported elsewhere in RSF-held territory. When foreign power competition weakens diplomatic leverage, it leaves those civilians with fewer advocates and fewer options.
Operationally, an RSF push into El Obeid would further degrade what remains of Sudan’s national army presence in central regions and could fracture command-and-control across the country. The town’s capture would consolidate RSF control across a belt running from Darfur eastward, complicating any future effort to reconstitute a unified national military or negotiate a power-sharing arrangement from a position of balance.
The report’s focus on Gulf rivalry adds a strategic layer to what might otherwise be seen as a localized civil war. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both invested heavily in Red Sea security, agricultural projects, and potential port and mining ventures in Sudan. Their competition—over influence, commercial access, and ideological posture—risks turning Sudan into another arena where local actors hedge between patrons rather than commit to peace processes that might limit their leverage.
For neighboring states such as Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, the prospect of a prolonged proxy-inflected conflict in Sudan means greater refugee flows, more weapons crossing porous borders, and higher odds that armed groups will look outward for revenue or sanctuary. For European and US policymakers, it adds another stress point along the migration and security routes that link the Sahel and Horn of Africa to the Mediterranean.
The deeper problem is that when external powers treat Sudan’s factions as instruments in a wider contest, the incentives tilt toward battlefield gains rather than compromise. As a result, cities like El Obeid become bargaining chips, not communities to be protected, and the cost of delay in diplomacy is measured in displaced families and destroyed infrastructure.
The next indicators to watch include whether RSF units begin a full-scale advance on El Obeid, how quickly Sudan’s army can reinforce or withdraw, and whether Riyadh and Abu Dhabi adjust their diplomatic posture—through public statements, quiet pressure on their Sudanese interlocutors, or engagement in multilateral forums. Any renewed Quartet effort, or visible split in voting and messaging at the United Nations and African Union, will reveal whether external actors are moving toward convergence or further competition over Sudan’s future.
Sources
- OSINT