Russia and China’s tech push challenges U.S. ‘Pax Silica’ and raises new national power fault lines
A Brazilian analyst argues that Russia and China are contesting U.S. dominance in the global technology race, where microchips, critical minerals and algorithms now function as tools of state power. His comments, referencing Washington’s ‘Pax Silica’ effort, highlight how digital infrastructure and supply chains are becoming front-line issues in geopolitics.
The technology race between major powers is widening into a broader contest over national power, with Russia and China pushing back against U.S. efforts to shape the rules of the digital age, a Brazilian expert has argued.
Alexandre Perez, a Brazilian analyst of international affairs, described digitalization as a tool of national power and said that competition over microchips, critical minerals, and advanced algorithms has fused with more traditional geopolitical rivalries. His assessment, given in an interview with a Russian outlet, casts Washington’s attempts to secure its own supply chains and standards under the banner of “Pax Silica” as one pole in an increasingly crowded field.
Perez characterized Pax Silica as a U.S.-led initiative to bolster America’s position in key technology sectors, from semiconductor manufacturing and design to the sourcing of minerals needed for batteries, data centers, and advanced electronics. The aim, as he framed it, is to create a more secure and U.S-centric digital order in which allies rely on American-approved hardware and software rather than Chinese or Russian alternatives.
Against that backdrop, he argued, Moscow and Beijing are not just reacting defensively to sanctions and export controls but actively working to challenge U.S. dominance. That includes China’s drive to build its own chipmaking capacity and 5G ecosystems, and Russia’s interest in alternative financial messaging systems, localized data storage, and cooperative tech arrangements with non-Western partners.
The people most directly affected by this strategic push and pull are not only engineers and policymakers. Manufacturers, cloud-computing providers, and even small software firms find themselves caught between competing compliance regimes and technology stacks. A chip supplier that once saw itself as a neutral vendor now has to track end users, retool supply lines away from restricted foundries, or risk being cut off from key markets.
Operationally, control over microchip production and the minerals that feed it has become a chokepoint similar to classic maritime straits. A disruption in access to advanced lithography equipment in one country can reverberate through car factories and server farms half a world away. Algorithms — from recommendation engines to military targeting software — embed values and strategic preferences that can either align with U.S., Chinese, Russian, or other frameworks, or clash with them.
Strategically, Perez’s comments highlight how the tech race is eroding the boundary between economic policy and security policy. Export controls on chips to Russia and China, restrictions on investment in certain Chinese tech sectors, and efforts to lock in long-term contracts for African and Latin American critical minerals all reflect this convergence. For countries in the global south, the pressure to choose partners in data infrastructure or 5G networks can translate into broader diplomatic alignment, whether they want it or not.
Pax Silica, as a concept, captures one side of this struggle: an attempt by the United States and allies to set rules, secure key nodes, and prevent rivals from weaponizing interdependence in semiconductors and digital infrastructure. But the response from Russia and China — from Beijing’s plans for self-sufficiency in chips to Moscow’s encouragement of alternative internet governance norms — shows that no single bloc can easily dictate the terms.
In this landscape, chips, cables, and code are no longer neutral plumbing; they are contested terrain where standards, access, and control matter as much as tanks and pipelines once did. Governments that misread this shift risk finding their industries dependent on supplies or platforms that can be turned off in a crisis.
Signals to watch include new export-control regimes on advanced chips and manufacturing tools, long-term offtake deals for lithium, cobalt, and rare earths, and the adoption of alternative payment or data-routing systems that reduce reliance on U.S-linked infrastructure. The way mid-sized powers and regional blocs position themselves in these technology choices will shape whether the world moves toward competing digital spheres or a more fragmented, negotiated patchwork.
Sources
- OSINT