Houthi seizure of Bab al‑Mandab island deepens Red Sea chokepoint risk
Houthi forces have reportedly taken Mayyun (Perim) Island in the Bab al‑Mandab Strait after advancing along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, tightening their grip on one of the world’s key oil and container shipping lanes. For ship crews, insurers, and governments, Red Sea transit is turning from a route choice into a calculated security gamble.
Control of the narrow waters between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is shifting again, and this time the leverage lies with an actor already at war with global commerce.
Local officials and eyewitnesses in Yemen are reporting that Houthi fighters have seized Mayyun, also known as Perim, a small island that sits almost in the middle of the Bab al‑Mandab Strait. According to these accounts, Saudi‑backed government forces withdrew from the island, allowing Houthi units to move in and complete what they describe as a broader takeover along that stretch of coastline after capturing the Red Sea port city of Mokha and pushing down the shore.
If confirmed, the move would give the Houthis a presence not just along Yemen’s western coast but on the island that effectively splits the Bab al‑Mandab into separate channels. That geography matters. Roughly a tenth of global seaborne trade and a significant share of oil and gas shipments pass through these waters on their way to and from the Suez Canal. Whoever can credibly threaten ships here doesn’t need to close the strait outright; creating enough risk and delay can be almost as costly.
For the crews of tankers and container ships already rerouting around Houthi threat zones in the Red Sea, the reported seizure tightens the noose. A presence on Mayyun would allow the group to monitor and potentially target ships transiting both the eastern and western passages of the strait using missiles, drones, or small boats. Even the perception that a non‑state actor aligned with Iran can sit astride such a chokepoint raises insurance premiums and forces operators to reconsider whether the time and fuel savings of Suez are worth the security exposure.
Regionally, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners face a harder problem. They intervened in Yemen in part to prevent exactly this outcome: an Iranian‑linked movement sitting at the mouth of the Red Sea. If their forces have ceded Mayyun and Mokha, they lose two anchors of a defensive line designed to keep Houthi power bottled up. Israel, which relies heavily on the Red Sea route for Asian trade and has already been targeted by Houthi missiles and drones, is watching closely; one Israeli official has already warned publicly that Houthi control of Bab al‑Mandab is more dangerous than the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.
Globally, the risk spills well beyond Yemen. Bab al‑Mandab is one of a handful of maritime chokepoints, along with Suez, Hormuz, and Malacca, that can move oil prices and shipping costs simply by becoming less predictable. A Houthi foothold on Mayyun doesn’t automatically block the strait, but it complicates naval patrols and escorts, and gives the group potential bargaining power in any negotiations over Yemen’s war or over their attacks on commercial traffic.
The reported advance also fits a pattern of the Houthis turning geography into leverage. They’ve already used long‑range drones and anti‑ship weapons to force a partial re‑routing of global shipping away from parts of the Red Sea. Planting a flag on an island in the chokepoint itself is a logical next step in that campaign, even if it risks inviting new strikes from regional adversaries.
Bab al‑Mandab risk doesn’t require a dramatic blockade; it only needs a group with weapons, a vantage point, and a willingness to act where the world’s trade has no easy detour.
The next signals to watch are whether Saudi‑backed forces try to retake Mayyun, whether outside navies adjust their patrol patterns through the strait, and how quickly shipping insurers reprice voyages that pass within range of Houthi‑held shores and islands. Any public confirmation or denial from Riyadh, Sana’a, or major naval forces operating in the area will clarify whether this is a brief tactical shift or a more durable change to who effectively controls the gate to the Red Sea.
Sources
- OSINT