Houthis Tighten Grip on Bab al‑Mandab as Iran‑Backed Forces Seize Coastal City and Island Gate to Red Sea
Yemen’s Houthi movement has consolidated control over the city of Dhubab and captured Perim Island at the Bab al‑Mandab Strait, according to Yemeni and regional sources. The advance gives an Iran‑aligned group influence over a narrow sea lane that links the Suez Canal route to the Indian Ocean and carries vital oil and container flows.
An Iran‑aligned militia now holds the high ground over one of the world’s most important maritime choke points. Yemeni and regional officials, cited by Al Jazeera and Agence France‑Presse, say Houthi fighters have completed their control over the coastal city of Dhubab and captured Perim (Mayun) Island, putting them astride the Bab al‑Mandab Strait at the southern mouth of the Red Sea.
Footage from Yemeni outlets shows a Houthi operative standing outside an administration building in Dhubab, presented as evidence that the group has taken over local governance structures. Other video places Houthi fighters operating near the Bab al‑Mandab itself. While independent access to the area is limited, the reported gains follow months of Houthi advances along Yemen’s western coast, backed, according to Yemeni government and regional officials, by Iranian weapons and military guidance.
Bab al‑Mandab is far narrower and less well known than the Strait of Hormuz, but no less strategic. It connects the Red Sea and the Suez Canal route to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. A large share of Europe‑Asia container traffic and Middle Eastern oil exports pass through its waters. Perim Island sits in the middle of this lane, offering whoever controls it a vantage point over passing ships.
For merchant sailors and shipowners, Houthi control raises immediate safety questions. The group has already demonstrated its ability to target vessels with missiles and drones, and to board and detain ships it deems hostile or linked to adversaries. An entrenched presence in Dhubab and on Perim potentially allows for closer surveillance of shipping and, if the leadership chooses, more systematic interference with traffic, whether through targeted attacks, intimidation, or the threat of mining.
The human costs, as usual, start onshore. Residents of Dhubab and nearby communities now fall under Houthi rule, with all that implies for local governance, conscription, and access to basic services. Yemen’s internationally recognized government, already displaced from the capital and much of the country, loses another foothold on the coast—and another bargaining chip in any future political settlement.
Strategically, the Houthi advance cements Iran’s influence at a second global chokepoint. Reuters has reported that Iranian support helped the militia seize the Red Sea port of Mocha further north; control of Dhubab and Perim extends that chain south. Combined with Iranian leverage in the Strait of Hormuz and allied militias along key land routes, it gives Tehran and its partners multiple pressure points on energy and trade flows that Europe and Asia depend on.
For Western navies and regional states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that’s a problem that can’t be ignored. Both Cairo and Riyadh rely on Red Sea traffic for revenue and security. Disruption at Bab al‑Mandab can cut into Suez Canal income, raise freight costs, and complicate military logistics. Warships from several countries already patrol nearby waters, but as with Hormuz, escorts cannot cover every vessel.
This fits a broader pattern in which non‑state actors with external backing use strategic geography as leverage. Houthis in Bab al‑Mandab, Hezbollah on the Lebanese frontier, and Iran’s proxies along Iraqi supply routes all turn chokepoints and borderlands into bargaining chips in a regional contest that reaches well beyond local grievances.
One thing worth keeping in mind: Bab al‑Mandab doesn’t need to be formally closed for it to matter. A militia with credible strike capabilities and a record of interference only has to raise the perceived risk enough that shipping companies start rerouting or adding security surcharges.
The next signs to watch are whether any major shipping line publicly diverts traffic around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Red Sea, whether insurers increase premiums for transiting Bab al‑Mandab, and how Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Western navies adjust their deployments. Any attempt to establish Houthi military infrastructure on Perim, or to formally regulate passage through the strait, would mark a sharper escalation in the struggle over who controls this narrow stretch of water.
Sources
- OSINT