Skibitskyi Warns Russian Missile Output Is Surging Faster Than Ukraine’s Defenses
Ukraine’s deputy military intelligence chief says Russia produced dozens of Iskander and Kh‑101 missiles in July, claiming output is exceeding targets even under sanctions. If accurate, those numbers would support a long campaign of deep strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure and complicate Western planning on air defense resupply.
Ukraine’s top battlefield challenge may no longer be whether it can shoot down Russian missiles, but whether it can keep pace with how fast Moscow is building them. In a recent interview, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine’s defence intelligence, outlined what he described as sharply rising Russian production of key long-range systems, offering specific monthly figures that, if correct, would signal a prolonged threat for Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
According to Skibitskyi, Russia produced 65 Iskander‑M ballistic missiles in July, exceeding an internal target of 60 missiles and reaching 108% of the planned quota. He also cited a figure of 87 Kh‑101 air‑launched cruise missiles produced during the same month. These claims have not been independently verified, and Moscow does not publicly confirm detailed production statistics for its strategic weapons. But they line up with Ukraine’s experience of frequent missile salvos and suggest that sanctions and export controls have not yet forced a decisive slowdown in Russia’s most important strike programs.
The Iskander‑M is a solid-fuel ballistic missile with a range sufficient to hit any target in Ukraine from well within Russian territory. The Kh‑101 is a stealthier cruise missile launched from strategic bombers, designed to fly low and evade radar. Both have been central to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian power stations, defense industry plants, logistics hubs and urban centers throughout the war. A monthly output on the order of dozens for each type would allow Russia to regularly assemble mixed salvos with enough density to saturate even layered air defenses.
For Ukrainian civilians, the consequences are already visible. Overnight on 11 August, authorities reported the use of Iskander‑M and Zircon-class missiles in strikes on Kyiv region and Zaporizhzhia that killed and injured civilians and damaged apartment buildings, hospitals and warehouses. Every new production batch in Russian factories effectively pre‑loads another set of nights when sirens, not sleep, will shape life in cities across Ukraine.
For Ukraine’s military planners and Western partners, Skibitskyi’s numbers raise hard questions about sustainability. Each Iskander or Kh‑101 costs far more than the anti-aircraft missiles or interceptor drones used to bring it down, but Russia’s centralized wartime economy can prioritize these programs. Ukraine, by contrast, relies heavily on a patchwork of Western-supplied systems — from Patriots and IRIS‑Ts to NASAMS and older Soviet‑era platforms — each with its own ammunition supply chain and political constraints.
Strategically, a sustained Russian production rate would allow Moscow to maintain pressure on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure while conserving older stocks of Soviet-vintage systems and newer hypersonic or dual-capable weapons for contingencies. It also sends a message to Western capitals: sanctions have raised costs and forced adaptation, but they have not yet made high‑end Russian missiles scarce. If Ukraine’s air defense stockpiles are not replenished as quickly as Russia can rebuild its arsenals, the balance in the long-range duel tilts toward the attacker.
The shareable insight is blunt: long-range wars are decided as much on factory floors as on front lines, and Russia’s ability to turn raw materials into guided missiles faster than Ukraine and its partners can field interceptors keeps Ukrainian civilians in harm’s way even when most missiles are shot down.
The next indicators to watch will be further public statements from Ukrainian and Western intelligence about Russian production trends, any visible changes in the pace and size of Russian missile barrages, and whether new sanctions packages begin targeting the specific components and firms that feed into programs like Iskander‑M and Kh‑101 at a scale large enough to slow the assembly lines.
Sources
- OSINT