Gulf Power Struggle Over Sudan Threatens El Obeid and Fragile Peace Talks
Saudi–UAE competition is again spilling into Sudan as the RSF prepares an assault on El Obeid, according to a detailed regional report, undercutting already fragile efforts to end the civil war. For civilians trapped in a key crossroads city and for diplomats chasing a settlement, Gulf rivalries are turning Sudan’s war into a proxy contest with no clear exit.
Sudan’s war is sliding further into a regional proxy struggle, with a renewed tug‑of‑war between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates said to be shaping battle plans around the strategically vital city of El Obeid. A recent in‑depth report by a respected Africa‑focused publication describes how competition between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Mohammed bin Zayed, after a brief lull during the U.S.–Iran war, is once more distorting peace efforts in Sudan.
According to the report, published on 26 June, the rivalry between the Gulf heavyweights is undercutting attempts to broker a political settlement between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group. The RSF is reportedly preparing a major assault on El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, a crossroads city that sits on key supply routes linking Khartoum, Darfur and the south. Control of El Obeid would offer either side an important logistical hub and a psychological victory in a war that has already fragmented the country.
The publication, which has a long track record of detailed reporting on African politics, links shifting Gulf calculations to the RSF’s battlefield posture, though specific military plans are hard to independently verify. What is clear is that foreign money, arms and political cover have fuelled both the RSF and elements within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), giving their leaders incentives to chase outright military victory rather than compromise.
For civilians in and around El Obeid, the stakes could not be higher. The city has already seen waves of displacement and shortages as fighting elsewhere disrupted trade routes. An RSF offensive or a battle for control with SAF forces would likely trigger urban combat, looting and further breakdown of basic services. Families that fled violence in Darfur or Khartoum could find themselves trapped again, this time in a city that outsiders view as a strategic prize rather than a place to protect.
The Saudi–UAE competition layers an additional complication onto an already tangled conflict map. Riyadh has positioned itself as a diplomatic broker on Sudan, hosting talks and working closely with the United States. Abu Dhabi has been accused by critics of backing the RSF, charges it has denied, while cultivating deep economic interests across the Red Sea corridor. Divergent Gulf priorities risk producing mixed signals to Sudanese factions: pressure to talk on one channel, tacit encouragement to fight on another.
That matters far beyond Sudan’s borders. Instability in North Kordofan and along the routes through El Obeid could spill over into trafficking corridors that run toward Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic, linking Sudan’s conflict to a wider Sahelian crisis. It also threatens the security of the Red Sea basin, a zone that key powers — including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Western navies — view as critical for trade, energy exports and migration control.
The broader pattern is that Sudan’s war is less an isolated civil conflict than a canvas on which regional powers project competing visions of security and influence. When their rivalry intensifies, peace initiatives lose coherence and local commanders get more reasons to hold out for better terms or push for gains on the battlefield.
The line likely to resonate outside policy circles is simple: as long as Sudan’s war doubles as a Gulf power contest, civilians in cities like El Obeid will pay the price for decisions made in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Humanitarian agencies and mediators will struggle to stabilize any ceasefire if their supposed sponsors are backing opposite horses.
The next signs to watch are movements of RSF and SAF units toward El Obeid and key surrounding roads; shifts in Saudi and Emirati public and private messaging on Sudan; and whether upcoming diplomatic tracks — including any new talks convened by Egypt, the African Union or Gulf states — reflect a more unified external position or further fragmentation. The fate of El Obeid will be a hard measure of whether Sudan’s war is being steered toward a negotiated end or toward another devastating set‑piece battle.
Sources
- OSINT