Russia–Iran Drone War and Hormuz Strikes Push Poland to Talk Openly About Fighting Russia
Poland’s foreign minister says Warsaw is ready to fight if Russia pushes beyond Ukraine, stressing that the country has F‑16s, F‑35s, Abrams tanks and HIMARS — and ‘an army that will fight’. The comments, delivered as U.S. forces hit Iran over Hormuz and Moscow keeps grinding in Ukraine, show how the war’s second‑order effects are nudging NATO states toward more explicit war planning.
The language European leaders use about war with Russia is changing. On 26 June, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski said Poland stands ready to act if Moscow poses a direct threat, promising that Warsaw would defend every inch of NATO territory. In remarks circulating in regional media, he underlined that Poland now fields F‑16 and F‑35 fighter jets, Abrams tanks and HIMARS rocket systems — and, crucially, “an army that will fight”.
Sikorski’s comments went beyond generic alliance solidarity. By ticking through specific U.S.‑made platforms and explicitly addressing the possibility that “if Putin wants war, if Ukraine does not satisfy him,” Poland would respond as it has in the past, he pointed to a shift from deterrence by membership to deterrence by readiness. The message was aimed as much at domestic audiences and allies as at the Kremlin: Poland is investing in the hard capabilities needed for high‑intensity conflict and is politically prepared to use them if required.
The statements land against a backdrop of continued Russian military pressure in Ukraine and a broader global uptick in direct state‑on‑state confrontation — underscored the same day by U.S. airstrikes on Iranian missile, drone and radar sites in southern Iran after Tehran’s attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. For Warsaw, which sees Russian victory or significant gains in Ukraine as a prelude to pressure on NATO’s eastern flank, the lesson from these crises is that clear signaling of willingness to fight can be as important as hardware itself.
For ordinary Poles, the message cuts both ways. On one hand, it reflects pride in a rapidly modernizing force that has moved from post‑Cold War austerity to some of the highest defense spending in NATO as a share of GDP. On the other, it acknowledges openly that the country is planning for scenarios in which Russian troops could be engaged directly, not just contained at arm’s length through training and arms deliveries to Kyiv. That is a psychological shift for a society whose collective memory still carries the weight of 20th‑century invasions.
Within NATO, Poland’s position underscores a growing divide between front‑line states, which see the risk of direct conflict with Russia as tangible and near‑term, and some Western European governments that still prefer more cautious messaging. By highlighting its F‑35s and HIMARS, Poland is also implicitly nudging allies that have been slower to commit to similar capabilities or to increase stockpiles of precision munitions and air defenses that would be critical in any large‑scale confrontation.
The strategic stakes are sharpened by Moscow’s own domestic strains. On the same day as Sikorski’s remarks, the Kremlin acknowledged awareness of a viral video in which Russian voices threaten an armed uprising over alleged abuses within the army. While the authenticity and impact of that recording remain unclear, it adds to the sense of an over‑stretched Russian military apparatus under pressure both at the front and at home. For neighbors like Poland, instability inside Russia does not necessarily reduce the risk; it can just as easily make the Kremlin more prone to external brinkmanship.
The underlying insight is that the war in Ukraine has transformed NATO’s eastern flank from a theoretical tripwire to a place where ministers speak casually about specific platforms they would use in a fight with Russian forces. The question for the alliance is no longer whether to prepare for that scenario, but how openly to talk about it without locking themselves into escalatory paths.
What to watch next is whether Poland’s rhetoric is matched by further concrete steps, such as additional permanent basing of U.S. assets, expanded exercises explicitly simulating defense against Russian incursions, or legal changes that speed mobilization. Equally important will be how Moscow answers this signaling — through its own deployments in Belarus and Kaliningrad, through nuclear rhetoric, or through cyber and hybrid probes designed to test just how ready Warsaw really is to back its words with action.
Sources
- OSINT