New Sudanese Banknotes in RSF Areas Deepen De Facto Partition and Test Economic Control
Freshly issued Sudanese pound notes have begun circulating in territory held by the Rapid Support Forces, raising questions over who controls the printing press and how long Sudan’s central bank can hold the line. For civilians in RSF areas, the color of their cash now doubles as a marker of which side rules their streets. This report examines how a war over cities is turning into a struggle over money itself.
A quiet but telling change is unfolding in Sudan’s civil war: the money in people’s pockets is starting to diverge. Newly issued Sudanese pound notes are now circulating in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to accounts citing traders and residents, deepening concerns that the country is sliding from a military standoff into a de facto economic partition.
The notes, described as fresh issues of the national currency, have appeared in markets and transactions across RSF‑held territory. It remains unclear whether they were supplied through channels linked to Sudan’s official central bank, diverted en route, or produced under alternative arrangements. Authorities in Khartoum have not publicly detailed how the notes entered RSF areas, while RSF leaders have not issued a formal statement explaining their origin.
For ordinary Sudanese living under RSF control, the stakes are immediate. Cash is often the only way to buy food, medicine or fuel in a fractured economy with unreliable banking services and frequent power cuts. If new notes coming from one side of the conflict are treated as suspect or discounted in another, sellers may start offering worse rates, demanding older bills or simply refusing certain denominations. People already displaced by fighting now have to worry whether the money they carry will be accepted if they cross into areas held by the national army.
Economists and diplomats have long treated control over a central bank and currency as a litmus test for state integrity. When rival authorities begin issuing or circulating different versions of the same money, it signals that political fragmentation is seeping into the core instruments of sovereignty. In Sudan’s case, reports of new notes used freely in RSF territory suggest that the paramilitary group is entrenching a governance structure that runs in parallel to, and increasingly apart from, the internationally recognized state.
Strategically, the appearance of new notes in RSF zones complicates efforts to use monetary policy as a tool for stabilization. If Khartoum’s central bank has lost visibility or control over how much currency ends up outside government‑held areas, it becomes harder to manage inflation, clamp down on counterfeiting or plan for reconstruction. If, on the other hand, the RSF has secured an independent source of banknotes—whether through foreign printing, captured stockpiles or partial cooperation from insiders—it gains another lever over local economies, from paying fighters to buying loyalty in markets.
The development risks pushing Sudan further down a path already traveled by other conflict‑ridden states. In Libya and Yemen, rival central banks and competing currencies have become enduring features of fragmented political orders, complicating everything from humanitarian aid transfers to oil revenue sharing. Once multiple authorities are effectively issuing or controlling money, reunifying the financial system tends to lag far behind any ceasefire on the ground.
For international actors trying to keep Sudan from breaking apart, the currency question is not a technical footnote. Humanitarian agencies working across front lines need clarity on which notes will be accepted where; commercial traders rely on predictable cash to move food and fuel; and any future peace deal will have to address how debts, deposits and salaries paid in different zones are reconciled. Money is becoming another front in the war, and those who control its flow can reward supporters and punish rivals without firing a shot.
The next signs to watch include whether Sudan’s central bank issues statements about the new notes, whether banks and money changers in army‑held areas start discounting or rejecting cash traced to RSF territory, and whether external actors—regional capitals or printing firms—are implicated in supplying currency. If different parts of Sudan begin to treat each other’s cash as second‑class, the country’s political fracture will be mirrored in every market stall and wage packet.
Sources
- OSINT