Published: · Region: Middle East · Category: geopolitics

CONTEXT IMAGE
Technology available in World War I
Context image; not from the reported event. Photo via Wikimedia Commons / Wikipedia: Technology during World War I

U.S. Moves to Approve F‑35s for Turkey Put NATO Technology and Power Balance Under Pressure

President Donald Trump is signaling he will soon sign off on the sale of F‑35 stealth fighters and F‑110 engines to Turkey, reviving one of NATO’s most fraught defense deals. The review, detailed by Vice President JD Vance, ties U.S. technology safeguards, Ankara’s ambitions for its KAAN fighter and the alliance’s cohesion into a single high‑risk decision. Readers will learn how this potential sale could reshape Turkey’s airpower and reopen old trust gaps inside NATO.

Washington is again weighing whether to hand some of its most sensitive airpower technology to a NATO ally that many in the U.S. defense establishment no longer fully trust. President Donald Trump has hinted that he is moving toward approving the long‑debated sale of F‑35 aircraft and F‑110 jet engines to Turkey, while his vice president, JD Vance, has acknowledged that the administration is actively reviewing the deal under a set of conditions.

Vance said that Defense Secretary Pete Buttigieg and his team are “examining the issue” because several conditions must be addressed before a green light. He did not spell those out in detail, but past U.S. concerns around Ankara’s defense ties with Russia and questions over technology security have repeatedly stalled Turkey’s participation in the F‑35 program. In parallel, Trump has publicly hinted that authorization could come soon, signaling a potential policy shift that would reverse years of freeze.

For Ankara, the stakes are immediate and concrete. Turkish officials want the F‑35s to renew an aging fighter fleet and the F‑110 engines to power the indigenous KAAN fighter jet, seen in Ankara as a cornerstone of its plan to replace some F‑16s and secure greater strategic autonomy. Turkish defense planners have presented KAAN not only as a national prestige project, but as a way to anchor Turkey’s role as a major regional airpower spanning the Black Sea, eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

In the U.S., the concerns run in the opposite direction. Critics across the defense and political spectrum worry that exporting fifth‑generation stealth aircraft and key engine technology to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government risks exposing American secrets and eroding Washington’s leverage over Ankara’s policy choices in Syria, the Black Sea and toward Russia. Commentators like conservative broadcaster Mark Levin have pressed Trump directly not to “hand over our best technology to Erdogan,” reflecting a broader unease over the Turkish government’s track record of independent deals, including its acquisition of Russian S‑400 air defense systems.

For NATO, the decision is about more than hardware. The alliance relies heavily on standardization and interoperable platforms to plan air campaigns, enforce no‑fly zones and manage deterrence. Integrating Turkish F‑35s into that network would deepen Ankara’s operational importance inside NATO at a time when its relations with fellow members, particularly Greece and some Baltic states, have oscillated between tactical cooperation and open friction. The deal would also affect the balance between Western‑supplied jets and emerging Russian, Chinese and indigenous designs in contested airspace from the Aegean to the Caucasus.

There is also a long‑term industrial dimension. Granting Turkey access to F‑110 engines for its KAAN project could accelerate Ankara’s drive to build and export its own advanced combat aircraft. That would reshape defense competition across the Middle East and parts of Asia, where countries now choosing between U.S., European and Russian platforms may see a Turkish‑built alternative backed by U.S. propulsion technology. For U.S. manufacturers and regulators, that raises questions about future export controls, maintenance dependence and how much of the intellectual property can truly be contained once the engines are in Turkish hands.

The tension is that the same jets that could pull Turkey closer into Western planning circles also give Ankara more options to chart its own foreign policy line. Advanced fighters are not just weapons; they are long‑term political commitments wrapped in metal, software and maintenance contracts that can bind or unbind allies over decades.

The next signals to watch are whether the administration formally notifies Congress of an intent to proceed, what conditions are attached on technology safeguards and Turkish behavior, and how Ankara responds if Washington tries to link the sale to issues such as its defense ties with Moscow or its posture in the eastern Mediterranean. That will show whether this is a narrow arms deal or part of a broader attempt to reset the strategic terms between the U.S. and a pivotal, but increasingly unpredictable, ally.

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