Report: Iran’s IRGC Builds Secret Iraqi Cells to Hit Gulf States Hosting U.S. Forces
A new report says Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has formed covert cells in Iraq to carry out drone strikes on Gulf countries that host U.S. troops, bypassing older proxy networks to avoid detection. If accurate, the shift would mark a dangerous evolution in Tehran’s playbook, putting American bases and Gulf infrastructure under quieter, deniable pressure.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has quietly established new covert cells in Iraq tasked with launching drone attacks against Gulf Arab states that host U.S. military forces, according to a report circulating in regional security circles. The units are described as distinct from Tehran’s long‑standing proxy militias, designed specifically to operate with greater deniability and less exposure to intelligence tracking.
The report alleges that the IRGC created these cells to target countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and others that host significant American air and naval assets. By building fresh structures rather than relying solely on existing Iraqi armed groups, the IRGC is said to be seeking to sidestep the monitoring that U.S. and allied services have developed on more established militias and their supply chains.
There is no independent public confirmation of the cells’ existence or operations, and the report does not point to specific recent attacks claimed by these units. But the concept fits a broader pattern: Iran’s security apparatus has long used layers of proxies and front organizations to wage a shadow conflict with the United States and its partners across the region, from rocket fire on diplomatic compounds in Iraq to drone and missile strikes that have hit oil processing facilities and airports along the Gulf.
For Gulf governments, the alleged shift raises both familiar and new worries. Critical infrastructure – desalination plants, power stations, export terminals and airports – already sits within range of drones and missiles launched from Yemen or Iran itself. The prospect of attacks originating from Iraqi soil by cells that are harder to map adds another angle of risk, one that complicates deterrence and attribution. If a drone hits a refinery or an American base, but the trail leads to a previously unknown cell rather than a branded militia, how clearly and quickly can states assign responsibility and calibrate their response?
For U.S. forces deployed in the region, the reported move suggests that the threat envelope is evolving faster than the visible map of militias and rocket‑capable groups. American bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and elsewhere have invested in layered air defenses against drones and missiles, and U.S. diplomats have leaned on Baghdad to rein in groups that target coalition forces. A new IRGC‑run cell structure would be designed precisely to operate at the edges of that system.
Strategically, the alleged Iraqi cells are a logical extension of Iran’s doctrine of "forward defense" – meeting perceived threats as far as possible from its own borders by leveraging partners abroad. Where that doctrine once relied primarily on large, named militias with political wings, the experience of years of U.S. and Israeli targeting has taught Tehran the costs of visibility. More covert cells, answerable directly to IRGC handlers, offer Tehran a way to keep pressure on adversaries while trying to lower the chance that any single strike triggers a full‑scale retaliation on Iranian soil.
The downside for regional stability is stark: the more fragmented and deniable the network of armed actors becomes, the harder it is for states on the receiving end of attacks to know when a "message" is being sent by Tehran and when a local commander is freelancing. That uncertainty can delay responses or, just as dangerously, prompt disproportionate reactions that misread the original signal.
This is why, in the Gulf’s shadow war, the most dangerous weapons are not always the drones themselves, but the ambiguity around who really launched them and on whose orders.
The key indicators to watch now include any uptick in low‑signature drone incidents against Gulf targets traced back to Iraqi airspace, shifts in Iraqi government rhetoric or security operations that hint at internal concern over new clandestine cells, and whether the United States publicly links future attacks to the IRGC rather than to local militias. How Baghdad responds – asserting sovereignty by cracking down or looking the other way – will be crucial in determining whether Iraq is treated as a launchpad or a buffer in the next phase of Iran’s confrontation with its Gulf rivals and the U.S.
Sources
- OSINT