Iran Says U.S.-Israel Strikes Forced It to Split Talks on Gaza War and Hormuz Risk Into Two Tracks
Iran’s foreign minister says negotiations have been divided into two stages after what he describes as U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, with the first phase focused on ending the war, the Strait of Hormuz, releasing frozen funds and reconstruction. For shippers, regional governments, and Washington, the message is that military pressure is now shaping the diplomatic timetable as much as any written memorandum. Readers will see how Tehran is framing talks, where the fault lines lie, and why Hormuz risk is back on the table.
Iran’s foreign minister has publicly recast the framework of sensitive regional negotiations, saying Tehran has split the talks into two stages because of what he called continuing attacks by the United States and Israel. The remarks entwine diplomacy over the Gaza war and regional security with military pressure and sanctions relief, and they put the Strait of Hormuz squarely back at the center of strategic concern.
Abbas Araghchi said that “because of difficulties in reaching an understanding, and because of the attacks by the United States and the Israeli regime against Iran, we decided to divide the negotiations into two stages.” In his account, the first stage has focused on four pillars: ending the war, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, the release of Iran’s blocked funds, and post‑war reconstruction. He suggested that a second, subsequent phase would tackle additional issues, though he did not spell out the full agenda or timeline.
Araghchi’s comments matter because they frame Iran’s participation in regional diplomacy as conditional and explicitly linked to perceived U.S. and Israeli military actions. Tehran is effectively telling Washington and its partners that attacks on Iranian territory or forces will have a direct cost in delay, complication, or even partial rollback of any emerging understandings, including the recently announced U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding that regional states have been scrutinizing.
The human and operational stakes behind this negotiating structure are considerable. For civilians in Gaza and across the region, the “end of the war” is not an abstract line in a communique but a question of whether bombardments, displacement and blockades ease or drag on. For crews on tankers and container ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the linkage between talks and security over the waterway translates into insurance premiums, routing decisions, and the ever‑present risk that an incident or miscalculation could trap them in the crossfire.
Strategically, putting Hormuz in the first stage formalizes what has long been implicit: Iran treats the strait as both an economic lifeline and a pressure lever. By tying its security posture there to war‑termination talks and sanctions relief, Tehran is signaling that any comprehensive deal will have to address its freedom of action around one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. For the United States, Gulf monarchies and major energy importers, that raises the stakes of both success and failure; mismanaging this track could leave vital sea lanes more exposed, even if some battlefield goals are met.
Araghchi’s reference to blocked Iranian funds and reconstruction also underlines that Tehran is thinking beyond immediate ceasefire dynamics to the economic landscape that will follow. Unfreezing assets and securing a role in rebuilding war‑damaged areas could provide the Iranian government with both domestic political capital and new levers of influence across the Levant. From Washington’s perspective, how and when those funds are released, and under what conditions, will be central to any debate over whether a memorandum with Iran constrains or empowers it.
The broader pattern is of a region where diplomacy and deterrence are increasingly fused. Phone calls like the one between the foreign ministers of Türkiye and Kuwait, which focused on the U.S.-Iran memorandum and regional developments, show how smaller and mid‑sized powers are trying to position themselves amid this recalibration. They have to plan for both a scenario where U.S.-Iran understandings reduce immediate crisis risk and one where talks stall and proxies escalate, keeping Hormuz and other chokepoints under constant threat.
The shareable takeaway is stark: Hormuz risk does not need a full blockade to matter—only enough uncertainty that ships, insurers and governments start gaming out what happens if the next incident closes the strait for a day, a week, or a month. When that uncertainty is wired directly into a negotiation track shaped by missile exchanges and airstrikes, the diplomatic calendar itself becomes a source of market risk.
In the days ahead, observers will watch for concrete signs of whether the first‑stage agenda Araghchi outlined moves forward: any shift in tempo of regional attacks, clearer language on war‑ending terms, practical steps on maritime security around Hormuz, or mechanisms to release frozen Iranian assets. They will also be looking for how Washington publicly characterizes the talks—and whether Israel or Gulf states signal comfort or alarm—since that will indicate whether this two‑stage framework is a negotiating tactic, a hard red line, or the new structure of Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Sources
- OSINT