Turkey’s Foreign Minister Says U.S. Strategy Is ‘Not Working’ and Signals New Security Map
Turkey’s top diplomat says Washington’s long‑standing foreign policy “is not working” and argues the era of hegemonic powers and fixed rules is ending — as Ankara pushes missile programs, alternative trade routes, and a more autonomous role. His comments signal a Turkey that sees itself as a stabilizing power in a fragmenting order, with consequences for NATO, Europe, India, and the Gulf.
Turkey is no longer content to be a junior partner in a U.S.‑led order that its leaders say is fading. In a sweeping set of remarks, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan argued that Washington’s foreign policy “is not working for the interests of the United States anymore,” warned that the strategic environment shaped by hegemonic powers and rigid institutions is “about to be gone,” and laid out a vision of Turkey as a reliable, stabilizing actor with its own missile deterrent and regional connectivity projects.
Fidan, speaking about Turkey’s neighborhood and global role, said Ankara sees the United States “remapping, reshaping their strategic perspective” after recognizing the limits of existing policy frameworks. As a result, he said, “we are seeing a gap emerging, especially in the European security architecture.” He paired this with a blunt assessment that some countries “still like to see the world as it used to be — dominated by some hegemonic powers and governed by some international rules and institutions,” but that this environment “is unfortunately gone, or about to be gone.”
For ordinary Turks, such rhetoric is not abstract. It reflects years of living on the fault lines of conflicts stretching from Syria and Iraq to the Black Sea and the South Caucasus, and of absorbing refugees and economic shocks as great‑power competition plays out nearby. A more assertive, autonomous foreign policy promises, in Ankara’s telling, to give the country greater control over its security and economic destiny — but it also means living with the risks of being a central player in multiple overlapping crises. For neighbors and allies, especially in Europe, it underscores that Turkey will act according to its own threat perceptions, not simply align with NATO consensus.
Deterrence is central to Fidan’s argument. Citing Turkey’s challenging neighborhood, he said it is “easy to assume that we really need deterrence,” referring to the country’s missile programs as part of its defense strategy. This dovetails with Ankara’s investment in indigenous systems and its controversial purchase of Russian S‑400 air defenses, which strained ties with Washington. A more capable Turkish missile force would complicate military planning for regional adversaries and, potentially, for allies who must factor Ankara’s independent capabilities into crisis scenarios.
Fidan also sketched an image of Turkey as a “reliable” and “stabilizing power in an increasingly unpredictable world,” listing regions from the Horn of Africa to the Black Sea and the Gulf where Ankara is “working toward solutions to the conflicts across our wider region.” He invoked the philosophy of Singapore’s founding leader Lee Kuan Yew — “the world doesn’t owe us a living” — as resonant with Turkey’s strategic outlook: self‑reliance, activism, and a readiness to operate without guarantees from larger powers.
That posture surfaces in Ankara’s approach to connectivity and partnerships. Fidan said Turkey had started discussions with Saudi Arabia to revitalize a train corridor running from Türkiye to Syria, then to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and onward to the Gulf — a potential alternative to maritime routes increasingly threatened by conflict. On India, he pushed back against the idea that Ankara’s ties with Pakistan should impede relations with New Delhi, urging India “not to read the issue from a different perspective” and emphasizing that Turkey has “no problem on a bilateral level” with India.
The combination of critical rhetoric toward Washington, a focus on indigenous deterrence, and activist diplomacy has several implications. For NATO, it confirms that one of its key members sees the alliance less as an end state than as one component of a broader, flexible strategy. European capitals already unnerved by war in Ukraine now face a Turkey that is both indispensable — for Black Sea access, Middle East engagement, and migration management — and less predictable.
If Ankara deepens missile capabilities and asserts a mediator role across multiple conflicts, the balance between cooperation and friction with the West will be delicate. Turkey’s moves on sanctions enforcement, energy transit, and defense exports could tilt outcomes in theaters from the Caucasus to North Africa. At the same time, if U.S. strategy is indeed being “remapped” as Fidan suggests, space may open for pragmatic bargains on air defense, fighter sales, and regional security files where interests still align.
Key Takeaways
- Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said U.S. foreign policy “is not working for the interests of the United States anymore” and that Washington is reshaping its strategic perspective.
- He argued that the era of hegemonic powers and fixed international rules is “gone, or about to be gone,” signaling Ankara’s belief in a more multipolar, fluid order.
- Fidan underscored Turkey’s need for missile‑based deterrence given its neighborhood and cast the country as a reliable stabilizing power from the Horn of Africa to the Black Sea and the Gulf.
- He highlighted talks with Saudi Arabia on a rail corridor linking Türkiye through Syria and Jordan to the Gulf and urged India not to let Turkey’s relations with Pakistan block bilateral ties.
- The remarks suggest Turkey will pursue a more autonomous course within NATO, with implications for European security architecture and U.S.–Turkey relations.
Outlook & Way Forward
Turkey is likely to keep investing in indigenous defense capabilities and missile systems, aiming to secure a credible deterrent that reduces its dependence on Western hardware and political conditions attached to it. That path will complicate procurement talks with the United States and EU states, but also strengthen Ankara’s bargaining power in disputes over Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Sea security.
Diplomatically, Ankara will continue to position itself as an indispensable intermediary in conflicts around its periphery, using connectivity projects like the proposed Türkiye–Syria–Jordan–Saudi rail link to reinforce its role as a regional hub. For Washington and European capitals, the task will be to accommodate a more independent Turkey where interests overlap — on Black Sea stability, counterterrorism, and energy — while managing divergences over Russia, the Middle East, and defense technology in a strategic landscape that Fidan insists is no longer governed by old assumptions.
Sources
- OSINT