Iran-Backed Militias Break from Iraq’s PMF, Exposing Tehran’s Shrinking Grip on Baghdad’s Guns
Two of Iraq’s most prominent Iran-backed factions say they are cutting formal ties with the Popular Mobilization Forces to place their weapons under direct state authority, a move welcomed by President Nizar Amedi. For Iraqi civilians and politicians exhausted by years of militia rule, the shift offers a rare chance to rebalance power between Baghdad and Tehran—but also risks a new struggle over who commands the street.
The quiet decision by powerful militias to step back from Iraq’s paramilitary establishment may matter as much for regional power balances as any speech from Tehran or Washington. By moving their guns, paychecks, and loyalties closer to the Iraqi state, they are testing whether Baghdad can finally reclaim the monopoly on force that has eluded it since the war against ISIS.
On 2 June, Iraqi President Nizar Amedi publicly endorsed an initiative by Qais al‑Khazali, the secretary‑general of Asa’ib Ahl al‑Haq, to formally disassociate his movement from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella body known in Arabic as Hashd al‑Shaabi. In parallel, both Asa’ib Ahl al‑Haq and the Imam Ali Brigade—groups long described as Iran‑backed—have formed structures to sever ties with the PMF and place their weapons under direct Iraqi state authority. Asa’ib announced the creation of a central committee to manage the transition, while Imam Ali’s leadership has also declared its intention to come under Baghdad’s control. These are self‑declared steps that will take time and legislation to fully implement, but they mark the first organized break of 2026 from the PMF by such influential factions.
For ordinary Iraqis, the implications are deeply personal. Many of these militias were both protectors and predators during the ISIS years: defending neighborhoods when the army collapsed, but later controlling checkpoints, extorting businesses, and intervening in local politics. Families in mixed Sunni‑Shia areas, in particular, have lived with the knowledge that a call from a commander could matter more than a court order. If weapons and chains of command genuinely shift into formal state hands, civilians could see fewer armed actors competing for control of streets, contracts, and smuggling routes.
The political symbolism is just as potent. The PMF is legal and nominally under the prime minister’s authority, but in practice has functioned as a constellation of semi‑autonomous forces with strong ideological and material ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Khazali’s decision—and President Amedi’s endorsement—signal that at least part of this constellation is willing to test a different alignment: one where Baghdad, not Tehran, is the final arbiter of when and how these groups fight. For Shia political parties wary of being seen as Iranian proxies, this offers a narrative of national sovereignty. For Sunni and Kurdish actors, it raises the possibility that federal institutions may finally start to overshadow militia patronage networks.
Regionally, the shift lands at a sensitive moment. Iran’s network of allied armed groups—from Lebanon’s Hezbollah to Yemen’s Houthis—has been central to its deterrence and power projection strategy. If Iraqi militias once aligned with that axis begin to detach institutionally from the PMF and submit more clearly to Baghdad, Tehran’s ability to mobilize Iraqi territory and fighters in a crisis could be constrained. That matters not only for the Gulf and Syria theaters, but also for how Iran responds to escalating tension with the United States over the Strait of Hormuz and nuclear talks.
Yet the risks of fragmentation are real. A declaration of loyalty to the state does not automatically erase years of parallel financing, intelligence sharing, and ideological training with Iran. If Baghdad fails to provide predictable budgets, legal guarantees, and a clear rank structure for these units, commanders could be tempted to maintain informal chains of command that answer to multiple patrons. Rival factions within the PMF that choose to remain close to Tehran might see the defections as a threat to their influence and respond by tightening control of lucrative sectors or intimidation campaigns.
What happens next will be decided less in press releases and more in barracks, ministries, and border crossings. Parliament and the defense establishment will need to determine under which legal framework these units will operate: fully integrated into the army, as a separate guard force, or in some hybrid form. That choice will shape not only who pays salaries, but who has the authority to deploy them inside cities or along frontiers. International partners—from the United States to European training missions—will watch closely to see whether the changes meet their benchmarks for human rights and chain‑of‑command, which would open the door to deeper security cooperation.
Key Takeaways
- Iraqi President Nizar Amedi has welcomed Qais al‑Khazali’s initiative to take Asa’ib Ahl al‑Haq out of the Popular Mobilization Forces framework.
- Both Asa’ib Ahl al‑Haq and the Imam Ali Brigade say they will sever formal ties with the PMF and place their weapons under direct Iraqi state authority.
- For Iraqi civilians, the moves could reduce the number of semi‑autonomous armed actors dominating everyday life, if implemented credibly.
- The changes may limit Iran’s ability to mobilize Iraqi militias as part of its regional proxy network, signaling a potential recalibration of Baghdad–Tehran relations.
- The outcome depends on whether Baghdad can institutionalize control over these forces without triggering new rivalries or leaving space for dual loyalties.
Outlook & Way Forward
In the near term, expect intense bargaining inside Baghdad’s security establishment as it works out rank equivalencies, budgets, and oversight mechanisms for the integrating units. Missteps—such as delayed pay, perceived demotions, or politicized appointments—could slow or even reverse the transition, weakening the government’s claim that it is bringing all arms under a single command.
Over the longer run, if the model succeeds, other factions could follow, gradually transforming the PMF from a parallel security pillar into a more conventional reserve and auxiliary structure. That would not erase Iran’s influence in Iraq, but it would make it harder to translate that influence directly into armed deployments. Conversely, if the effort stalls or dissolves into cosmetic changes, the episode will serve as a reminder that real demobilization and integration in Iraq require not just declarations, but sustained political will, institutional capacity, and a security environment where parties believe the state can actually protect their interests.
Sources
- OSINT