Netanyahu Orders Army to Control 70% of Gaza Territory
On 28 May 2026, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told a conference that he has directed the Israeli military to increase its control of Gaza from 60% to 70%. The order signals an intensification of ground operations and a likely expansion of long‑term Israeli presence inside the enclave.
Key Takeaways
- Prime Minister Netanyahu said on 28 May 2026 that Israeli control in Gaza has risen from 50% to 60%, and he has ordered a move to 70%.
- The directive indicates ongoing and possibly expanded Israeli ground operations and security zones within the Gaza Strip.
- The statement coincides with Netanyahu’s broader rhetoric favoring settlement expansion and long‑term strategic depth against Iran.
- Increased territorial control risks higher civilian displacement, infrastructure damage, and international legal scrutiny.
- The move will complicate any future political settlement and could harden positions among Palestinian factions and regional states.
At the Jordan Valley Conference on 28 May 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly outlined a target to deepen Israel’s military control over the Gaza Strip. In remarks reported at 17:38–17:59 UTC, he stated that Israel had moved from controlling 50% of Gaza to 60%, and that his directive is now to reach 70%. A separate report at 17:59 UTC framed this as a formal order to the army to take control of 70% of Gaza.
These comments provide an unusually explicit metric for Israel’s operational objectives in the enclave, suggesting that the government envisions a significant and possibly enduring expansion of areas under direct Israeli military control. While the precise definition of “control” is not clarified—whether it relates to permanent deployments, security corridors, or operational dominance—the numbers indicate a steady upward trajectory.
Netanyahu’s statement aligns with a broader strategic narrative he has articulated in recent days. Other contemporaneous remarks emphasize the role of Israeli military power in attracting regional alliances against Iran, dismiss the idea that Arab states normalized relations because of progress toward Palestinian statehood, and highlight settlement expansion across the “Land of Israel” as a national mission. He has also referenced opportunities to reroute global energy flows through the Eastern Mediterranean away from the Gulf, underscoring a long‑term vision of Israel as a regional security and energy hub.
The key actors affected by this directive are the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Palestinian civilian populations in Gaza, and neighboring states that could absorb displaced residents or become involved in mediation. On the military side, the IDF will need to allocate additional brigades, logistics, and intelligence resources to sustain control over a larger portion of the territory, likely including expanded buffer zones, checkpoints, and persistent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) coverage.
For civilians, increased Israeli control typically translates into movement restrictions, expanded demolition zones, and heightened risk of crossfire as armed groups seek to contest key areas. Humanitarian organizations will face greater access challenges and may have to adapt aid delivery to a shifting front line. International legal bodies and rights organizations will scrutinize any patterns of displacement, property destruction, and civilian casualties associated with the push to 70% control.
Regionally, the move is likely to harden the positions of Hamas and other Palestinian factions, who will frame the expansion of Israeli control as de facto annexation or long‑term occupation. It may also complicate Egypt’s role as a mediator and gateway for humanitarian aid via Rafah, especially if Israeli forces move closer to or across the Philadelphi Corridor. Arab and Muslim‑majority states, already under domestic pressure over the Gaza war, will find it more difficult to advocate incremental normalization steps or security cooperation with Israel under these conditions.
Internationally, the directive will increase friction with partners in Europe and North America who have publicly supported Israel’s right to self‑defense but are wary of open‑ended occupation or large‑scale demographic engineering. Against the backdrop of new EU sanctions targeting abuses in the West Bank and Israel’s rupture with the UN Secretary‑General’s office, a visible expansion of territorial control inside Gaza will likely deepen calls for conditionality on military support and post‑war governance arrangements.
Outlook & Way Forward
In the short term, analysts should expect intensified IDF operations in sectors of Gaza not yet under sustained Israeli presence, including possible pushes into remaining urban centers or strategic corridors. Satellite imagery, open‑source battlefield mapping, and humanitarian access reports will help validate whether the 70% target translates into tangible on‑the‑ground expansion or remains primarily rhetorical.
Over the medium term, the central question is whether Israel intends this level of control as a temporary wartime configuration or the basis for a new, long‑term security order in Gaza. If the latter, we can anticipate efforts to institutionalize buffer zones, border controls, and possibly local proxy governance structures, which would make any return to full Palestinian administrative control highly unlikely. This would significantly complicate regional diplomacy and any prospective two‑state negotiations.
Strategically, increased control in Gaza intersects with broader regional dynamics involving Iran, Hezbollah, and emerging U.S.–Iran arrangements over the Strait of Hormuz. A more entrenched Israeli footprint in Gaza could either be used as leverage in wider security dialogues or serve as a trigger for additional resistance by Iranian‑aligned groups. Monitoring changes in cross‑border rocket fire, attacks from Lebanon, and responses from key Arab capitals will be crucial to assessing whether Netanyahu’s 70% directive stabilizes Israel’s security environment or sets the stage for a protracted, multi‑front confrontation.
Sources
- OSINT