Sudan’s RSF Displays US-Made Anti-Tank Weapons In New Footage
On 23 May 2026, Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces released video showing fighters equipped with multiple anti-tank systems, including what appear to be US-made 66mm M72 LAW launchers. The footage raises fresh questions about arms flows into Sudan’s protracted internal conflict.
Key Takeaways
- New video released on 23 May shows Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in possession of several anti-tank weapons.
- The arsenal appears to include US-manufactured disposable 66mm M72 LAW launchers.
- The presence of such systems underscores porous regional arms networks and the risk of advanced weapons proliferation.
- Enhanced RSF anti-armor capability could shape ground tactics and humanitarian conditions in contested urban areas.
At approximately 18:04 UTC on 23 May 2026, new imagery circulated from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a major belligerent in the country’s ongoing civil conflict. The video showed RSF militants posing with and operating an array of anti-tank weapons, prominently featuring disposable launchers that defense analysts quickly identified as US-made 66mm M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons (LAW). The acquisition of such systems by the RSF adds a potent dimension to its combat capabilities against armored vehicles and fortified positions.
The M72 LAW, originally developed for Western forces, is a lightweight, single-use launcher designed for infantry anti-armor engagement. Its presence in Sudan is not entirely unprecedented—similar systems have appeared in other African and Middle Eastern conflict zones via decades of arms transfers, battlefield capture, and illicit trafficking. However, their visible concentration in the hands of a non-state actor engaged in intense urban and peri-urban fighting is cause for concern, suggesting recent inflows or redeployment from neighboring theaters.
The RSF, formed from elements of the former Janjaweed militias, has been locked in a brutal struggle with Sudan’s regular armed forces and other factions over control of key cities, natural resources, and political authority. Anti-tank weapons provide a significant force multiplier in such an environment, allowing lightly equipped units to threaten tanks, armored personnel carriers, and even hardened defensive positions. In dense urban settings like parts of Khartoum and Darfur, short-range, disposable launchers can also be used opportunistically from buildings and alleyways, creating serious challenges for conventional forces.
The apparent US origin of some of the RSF’s equipment raises the broader question of weapons diversion. Possible pathways include leakage from regional stockpiles supplied by Western countries, capture from partner forces, or clandestine market purchases facilitated by transnational criminal networks. Regardless of the exact route, the end result is that munitions once provided to state actors under end-use agreements are now helping fuel a highly destructive internal war marked by widespread civilian harm.
From a conflict dynamics perspective, the RSF’s enhanced anti-armor capability could alter tactical balances on several fronts. Sudanese government forces may be forced to limit deployment of heavy armor in contested urban centers, rely more on indirect fires and airpower, or invest in active protection systems and better infantry-armor coordination. Such shifts could, in turn, increase the risk of collateral damage if artillery and airstrikes are used in lieu of ground assaults to reduce RSF positions.
The humanitarian consequences are already severe. Urban fighting with heavy weapons has displaced large numbers of civilians, damaged critical infrastructure, and impeded aid delivery. As both sides escalate their use of stand‑off and area-effect weapons to avoid direct confrontation, civilian neighborhoods risk becoming inadvertent front lines. The RSF’s public display of anti-tank systems can also be read as a psychological operation, signaling resolve and capability to adversaries and local communities alike.
Outlook & Way Forward
In the short term, observers should expect a further entrenchment of heavy-weapons use in Sudan’s conflict, particularly around strategic urban centers and transport corridors. RSF units equipped with M72 LAW and similar systems will likely prioritize ambushes against armored columns, checkpoints, and supply convoys, aiming to disrupt government logistics and create pockets of encirclement. Government forces may respond by increasing the use of drones, reconnaissance assets, and long‑range fires to identify and neutralize RSF positions before committing armor.
Internationally, the visible presence of US-made weapons in the hands of the RSF will add urgency to calls for stricter arms control and end-use monitoring across the broader region. Donor states may reassess existing security assistance programs to neighboring countries, strengthen stockpile security requirements, and support regional mechanisms to track and interdict illicit arms flows. Multilateral forums addressing the Sudan crisis are likely to incorporate weapons proliferation more explicitly into ceasefire monitoring and sanctions discussions.
For humanitarian actors, the proliferation of anti-tank systems complicates access and safety planning, particularly on routes that might be targeted for ambushes. Agencies will need to reassess road movement risk and may press for localized deconfliction arrangements that include explicit commitments from armed groups not to use heavy weapons near designated humanitarian corridors. Without substantial progress on a political settlement and more effective control of arms supplies, the presence of systems like the M72 LAW in Sudan points to a worsening trajectory for both conflict intensity and civilian harm through 2026.
Sources
- OSINT