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New Flash‑Chip Attack Bypasses TPM Lockouts to Speed Brute‑Forcing of Windows PINs
Researchers have demonstrated a flash‑chip attack that bypasses Trusted Platform Module lockout protections on many Intel and AMD PCs, cutting the brute‑force time for Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs from years to days, The Hacker News reports.
Security researchers have shown that physically attacking a computer’s flash memory chip can defeat a key safeguard in Windows device security, allowing attackers to brute‑force certain PINs much faster than intended.
Coverage in The Hacker News on 18 November describes how researchers targeted the flash chip that stores critical state for the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). By manipulating this chip, they were able to bypass TPM lockout protections that normally slow or block repeated guesses of Windows Hello and BitLocker PINs.
On affected Intel‑ and AMD‑based PCs, the TPM is meant to enforce limits on failed login attempts, stretching out the time it would take to try every possible PIN to the point where such an attack becomes impractical. The flash‑chip method resets or sidesteps those counters. Once that happens, an attacker with the right tools can run high‑speed guessing attacks, reducing the time needed to break a PIN from years to days.
The technique requires physical access to the device and enough skill to open the case and work directly with the flash component. That puts it beyond opportunistic theft but within reach for well‑resourced actors, including advanced criminal groups and state services that can take a laptop out of its owner’s sight.
The report stresses that BitLocker’s underlying encryption is not being cracked. Instead, the security model that assumes TPM‑enforced throttling will protect shorter PINs is being undermined by changes to how TPM state is stored and checked.
For governments, companies and travelers who rely on BitLocker to keep data safe if a machine is lost, stolen or seized, the research undercuts previous assumptions about how much protection a TPM‑backed PIN really provides against a determined, hands‑on attacker.
Mitigations discussed in the security community include using longer and more complex PINs or passwords with BitLocker and, where possible, adding extra factors such as smartcards. Future hardware designs may also need to reconsider how TPM state is stored to make such flash‑level manipulation harder or easier to detect.
Key developments to watch will be vendor advisories from Microsoft, Intel and AMD, and any guidance they issue for high‑risk users or system builders in response to this attack.