Published: · Last updated: with original publication · Region: Eastern Europe · Category: intelligence

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Zelensky says North Korean missiles could sharply raise Russia’s monthly strike capacity

President Volodymyr Zelensky reports that Russia is now receiving “dozens” of KN‑23 ballistic missiles per month from North Korea. Combined with earlier estimates of Russian output, that flow would significantly expand Moscow’s ability to keep launching large salvos against Ukrainian targets.

Volodymyr Zelensky is warning that North Korean support may be giving Russia a sizable new pool of ballistic missiles for use against Ukraine.

Zelensky says Russia is now receiving “dozens” of KN‑23 ballistic missiles per month from North Korea. Using a minimum assumption of 24 missiles a month for the term “dozens,” and combining that with prior public reporting that Russia produces around 100 ballistic missiles monthly, analysts cited in the reporting calculate that Moscow could now have access to more than 124 ballistic missiles per month.

That production figure for Russia comes from The Economist’s September reporting that Russian industry turns out about 100 ballistic missiles per month, including Iskander‑M and RM‑48U modified S‑400 systems. Adding a North Korean stream on top of that would help explain Russia’s ability to maintain a high tempo of strikes despite repeated Ukrainian claims that its stockpiles were running low.

The KN‑23 is a short‑range ballistic missile comparable in concept to Russia’s Iskander. Supplying it to Russia would deepen a military relationship that has already drawn Western criticism, and it would entangle North Korea more directly in the war in Europe.

For Ukrainian cities, an expanded flow of ballistic missiles translates into more salvos like those already hitting places such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Smila. Ballistic missiles are difficult to stop, particularly in regions without the most advanced air‑defence systems, and can be used to hit infrastructure and urban areas far from the front.

For Ukraine’s military planners, the prospect of Russia being able to launch over 124 ballistic missiles per month complicates decisions on how to allocate finite air‑defence interceptors and radar coverage. Keeping up with frequent, large salvos places additional pressure on Ukraine’s partners to supply more systems and munitions.

Strategically, reported KN‑23 deliveries push North Korea further into a role as an external supplier sustaining Russia’s war effort. Moscow would gain flexibility to conserve some of its own production while leaning on imports, at the cost of tighter scrutiny of its arms links with a heavily sanctioned state.

Future evidence that could clarify the scale of this trade includes identified KN‑23 debris after Russian strikes, updated assessments from Western intelligence agencies on North Korea–Russia transfers, and any new sanctions or interdiction efforts targeting the routes believed to be used for moving these missiles.

Sources