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Bab el‑Mandeb Under New Pressure as Sanaa Forces Seize Bases Overlooking Key Shipping Strait
Yemen’s Sanaa-aligned forces say they have captured key positions overlooking the Bab el‑Mandeb Strait after rival units withdrew, shifting control over one of the world’s busiest maritime chokepoints. The advance pulls commercial shipping, regional navies, and Red Sea energy routes deeper into Yemen’s war map.
Control of the narrow Bab el‑Mandeb Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea is tilting again, as Yemen’s Sanaa-aligned forces claim fresh gains on the ground that give them stronger leverage over one of global trade’s most sensitive waterways.
On 15 November, Yemeni sources described an operation named “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment,” under which Sanaa forces moved into several areas on the southern coast after units loyal to the Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council withdrew. According to those accounts, Sanaa fighters took control of Dhubab Airport, Al‑Suqayyah, Amnabiyah, and Al‑Azaf, as well as the strategic heights of Jabal Kahbub and Jabal Hajijah. The positions sit near the Bab el‑Mandeb, the roughly 20-kilometer-wide strait that links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden.
The advances, if consolidated, mean that more of the coastline and overlooking high ground near the strait is now in the hands of the same political-military camp often referred to as Ansarallah or the Houthis. Reporting also indicates that a long-running siege of an Ansarallah garrison in the area was lifted, removing one of the last pocketed positions that constrained Sanaa’s ability to maneuver near the waterway. Independent confirmation from outside Yemen remains limited, but the moves align with a steady pattern of Houthi expansion along both the Red Sea and southern coasts.
For local residents in the coastal belt, the gains change who sets checkpoints, collects taxes, and controls access to ports and fishing grounds. Families in places like Dhubab live alongside a front that has repeatedly shifted over the past decade, bringing new command structures each time. As Sanaa’s forces entrench, aid organizations, traders, and fishermen will have to recalibrate how they navigate security guarantees and permissions in a landscape where a misjudged trip can now cross an active military line.
For ship crews and operators routing vessels through Bab el‑Mandeb, the shift is more abstract but no less consequential. The strait handles a significant share of Europe‑Asia container traffic and oil flows from the Gulf and Red Sea exporters. Even before this latest advance, missile and drone launches from Yemen had forced navies from the United States and its partners to maintain a heavy presence, while some commercial operators diverted around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Houthi-claimed attack zones. Stronger Sanaa control over coastal high ground and airstrips means more space to disperse drones, anti-ship missiles, and radar assets that can threaten passing traffic or at least be used rhetorically to raise the stakes.
Strategically, these gains deepen a trend in which Yemen’s internal war is tightly fused with regional power competition and freedom-of-navigation concerns. The Bab el‑Mandeb is the southern bookend to the Suez Canal and a critical link in Europe’s energy and goods supply chain. Any actor with credible reach into that space can shape insurance rates, military deployments, and diplomatic messaging. Sanaa’s leadership has already used previous maritime attacks and threats to press its demands in the broader confrontation involving Saudi Arabia and, indirectly, Western backers.
The new positions also create a more layered challenge for the Aden-based government and its foreign supporters. Regaining lost ground on the rugged southern coast will require amphibious capability, close air support, and significant logistics, all under the eye of adversaries who have spent years honing their use of guided missiles and drones against armored vehicles and static sites. The longer Sanaa’s forces sit on the coastal heights and airfields, the more time they have to fortify them and integrate them into a defensive network.
Global trade doesn’t need a full blockade of Bab el‑Mandeb to feel pain; a credible threat of attack in a narrow channel is enough to slow transits, inflate insurance, and push some cargoes onto longer and more expensive routes. That is the leverage Sanaa’s camp gains when it swaps isolated garrisons for connected ground overlooking the sea.
The next indicators to watch include whether naval incident reports in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden increase, whether any state openly adjusts naval rules of engagement near the strait, and whether Sanaa’s authorities publicly link their new positions to specific conditions for de‑escalation. Regional diplomacy around Yemen and Red Sea security will reveal how much the latest advance is treated as a local shift—and how much as a new bargaining chip in a wider contest over shipping lanes.