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Turkey–Iraq deal to target PKK‑linked forces puts Sinjar’s Yazidi YBŞ in the firing line
Turkey and Iraq agreed on 8 November to eliminate remaining PKK‑affiliated fighters in Sinjar, a northern Iraqi district where the Yazidi Sinjar Resistance Units formed to defend the community against ISIS, raising concerns that counter‑PKK moves will draw in Yazidi forces and reshape local power.
A new security understanding between Turkey and Iraq has put Sinjar’s Yazidi fighters and a sensitive corner of northern Iraq under renewed pressure.
On 8 November, Ankara and Baghdad agreed to eliminate remaining Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)‑affiliated forces from Sinjar, a mountainous district near the Syrian border. Sinjar is home to the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ), a majority‑Yazidi armed group created to defend the community against ISIS. The YBŞ maintains links to the PKK and has shared fighters with it.
Those links have long made YBŞ structures a focus of Turkish concern. Turkey classifies the PKK as a terrorist organisation and has prioritised clearing what it views as PKK extensions across its southern frontier. The latest agreement signals that Baghdad supports moves to remove PKK‑affiliated formations from Sinjar, at least in principle.
For Yazidi fighters and civilians, the risks are clear. The YBŞ grew out of local self‑defence after mass killings and enslavement by ISIS, and many Yazidis distrust both the Iraqi central government and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Peshmerga forces. Being caught up in a campaign against PKK‑linked groups raises the prospect of new displacement or confrontation with state or foreign forces.
Baghdad’s acceptance of language on eliminating PKK‑linked forces reflects both pressure from Turkey and a desire to assert federal authority in areas where non‑state and party militias have held sway. Yet Iraqi forces already face demands on several fronts, from securing the Syrian border to managing relations with various Popular Mobilization Forces units, and the practical steps they can take in Sinjar are uncertain.
The deal also plays into wider Kurdish politics and regional influence. In Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish politician Muhammad Haji Mahmoud, who is close to Iran, said Tehran opposes splitting the Kurdistan Region into two separate administrations and instead backs a unified region and an agreement between the KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). That stance shows Iran’s interest in preserving a single Kurdish authority it can work with and limiting fragmentation that could invite deeper Turkish or Western involvement.
Sinjar sits at the intersection of these agendas. It falls under Iraqi federal authority, is claimed by the Kurdistan Regional Government, is central to Yazidi identity and is seen by Turkey as part of a PKK logistics and training route extending into northeastern Syria. A joint Ankara–Baghdad push there could weaken YBŞ structures and, depending on implementation, either draw Yazidi fighters into state forces or push them to seek new backers.
Operations in Sinjar matter beyond the district’s size because it overlooks routes used for smuggling, trade and fighter movement between Iraq and Syria. Escalation that disrupts local governance and security could open space for ISIS remnants or other armed groups.
Key signals in the coming period will be whether Iraqi forces or aligned units move into YBŞ‑held areas, whether Turkey carries out new airstrikes in or near Sinjar under the agreement, and whether Yazidi representatives are given a role in talks on the area’s future. The way these steps unfold will determine whether the deal brings greater protection for Yazidi civilians or simply reshapes who exerts armed control over them.