U.S. Cuts Gulf Diplomatic Staff After Memo Warns Iran Plots Assassinations of American Officials
A newly declassified U.S. intelligence memo says Iran has “substantially increased” efforts to assassinate American diplomats and officials in the Middle East and beyond, with some plots already in advanced stages. The warning has already led Washington to reduce staff at missions in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Lebanon, Qatar and Jordan.
American diplomats and senior officials are again absorbing direct security risk as the confrontation with Iran shifts from rhetoric to specific plots.
A U.S. intelligence memo dated 23 October, addressed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, warns that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to assassinate American diplomats and officials in the Middle East and beyond. According to public accounts of the document, some of these plans have reached “advanced stages,” though the memo’s full operational details have not been released.
In response, the State Department has reduced diplomatic staff in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Qatar and Jordan. Drawdowns at multiple posts signal that Washington sees the threat as immediate rather than hypothetical, similar to measures normally taken in open war zones or during acute crises.
For embassy and consulate teams, this kind of warning changes daily life. Security rules tighten, movements shrink, and large public events are scaled back or cancelled. Families may be relocated. The basic work of diplomacy — direct contact with officials, business leaders and civil society — becomes harder to sustain.
Host governments also lose access. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and Lebanon depend on close coordination with U.S. envoys for defense cooperation, sanctions enforcement, arms deals and intelligence sharing. Fewer American officials on the ground mean slower communication and fewer informal channels just as tensions tied to the war involving Iran are already stretching security services.
Iranian leaders have long pledged to retaliate for U.S. actions, including the 2020 killing of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and later strikes linked to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Attempts to target U.S. and partner officials have surfaced before. The memo’s language about both a “substantial” increase and “advanced stages” points to a broader, more organized effort rather than isolated threats.
If assassination attempts on U.S. personnel become a recurring tool of Iranian statecraft, they will complicate any American attempt to ease the wider regional confrontation. Presidents can adjust troop deployments or sanctions lists, but credible plots against their own officials demand a direct response, raising the risk of escalation.
Regional security services in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Amman and Beirut now face pressure from both sides. They are expected to disrupt any cells planning attacks on Americans while managing the domestic political cost of acting in line with U.S. security priorities.
Signals that would change this picture include formal travel advisories or evacuation orders for specific U.S. missions, any public response from Iran or Iranian‑aligned groups to the memo, and announcements of disrupted plots or related arrests in the region.
Sources
- OSINT