Iran’s Guards threaten Hormuz internet cables, raising global chokepoint risk
An Iranian Revolutionary Guards spokesperson has warned that seven major undersea internet cables passing beneath the Strait of Hormuz could be cut if war against Iran resumes. The threat turns a familiar oil chokepoint into a digital one, putting global data flows, finance, and trade infrastructure on notice.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have moved beyond threatening tankers and oil flows in the Strait of Hormuz and are now openly pointing at another set of arteries that keep the global economy alive: the internet cables on the seabed beneath the strait.
A Guards spokesperson warned that seven major communications cables pass under Hormuz and claimed that “all the world’s internet and commerce data depend on them.” The official added, in a pointed message directed at Iran’s adversaries, that “we mention this so that the enemy will know,” followed by a statement on social media that “the world will see what happens” if war against Iran is renewed.
Undersea fiber‑optic cables carry the overwhelming majority of international data, including financial transactions, corporate traffic, and the backbone of consumer internet services. The exact routing and redundancy of those cables is more complex than the Iranian spokesperson’s sweeping claim suggests, but Hormuz is indeed a narrow, militarized chokepoint where a small number of cables handle a disproportionate share of regional connectivity between the Gulf, Asia, and the wider world.
For shipping crews and energy companies, Hormuz is already synonymous with risk to tankers. The Guards’ statement adds a different kind of pressure: that war in and around the strait could now be fought as much in data centers and cable landing stations as in oil terminals. It puts telecom operators, banks, and logistics firms into the blast radius of any confrontation that might previously have been seen mainly as an oil and shipping story.
The operational challenge in cutting seabed cables is significant but not insurmountable for a state with naval assets and specialist divers. Cables lie exposed or lightly buried on the seabed and are typically armored only near shore. Sabotage can involve surface ships deploying grapnels to drag and sever lines, submarines or specialized vessels conducting more precise work, or even explosive charges. Repairs are possible but slow, especially in contested waters, and require dedicated cable‑laying ships to locate, retrieve, splice, and relay the fiber.
Strategically, by naming the cables and framing them as leverage, Iran is signaling that any large‑scale strike campaign against its territory—whether by Israel, the United States, or regional rivals—would trigger a response that ripples far beyond the Middle East. Disrupting traffic through Hormuz doesn’t need a total blockade to matter; a few severed fibers or credible threats can force insurers, telecoms, and multinationals to reroute, delay, and rethink exposure.
The warning lands as tensions with Israel rise, including reported air confrontations and Iran’s rush of new Kowsar fighter jets into patrols despite incomplete testing. It fits a broader pattern in which Iran tries to expand the battlefield horizontally, from energy infrastructure to cyber networks to maritime choke points, in order to raise the cost of pressure campaigns and sanctions.
For governments and companies, the Guards’ statement is a reminder that undersea cables are both critical infrastructure and relatively soft targets. Contingency planning—alternate routing, satellite backup, regional peering arrangements—can blunt the blow, but any prolonged, combat‑driven repair delay in Hormuz would still strain Gulf states, South Asia, and segments of European and African connectivity.
What matters next is whether this threat is folded into Iran’s formal deterrence posture—repeated by senior officials, referenced in military exercises, or accompanied by unusual naval activity near charted cable routes—or remains a one‑off rhetorical shot. Satellite tracking of Iranian naval and auxiliary vessels around Hormuz, changes in cable‑repair ship deployments, and any quiet warnings from Western or Gulf governments to carriers and banks will be early clues to whether the world takes this threat as serious planning or strategic theater.
Sources
- OSINT