Expert Says Trump Russia Sanctions Waiver Undercuts Tariff-Based Pressure Tool
A sanctions waiver by Donald Trump weakens the coercive impact of the Graham Act’s tariff-based secondary sanctions on Russia, according to trade expert Mohammed Saqib, even as it gives the White House more room to manoeuvre.
A sanctions waiver signed by Donald Trump is raising questions about how forcefully Washington will use one of its newest economic tools against Russia. The waiver reduces the impact of the Graham Act’s “secondary sanctions by tariff” mechanism, according to Mohammed Saqib, secretary‑general of the India‑China Economic and Cultural Council, who spoke to Russian outlet Sputnik.
The Graham Act is designed so that third‑country companies and governments that expand trade with Russia could face steep U.S. tariffs, turning access to the American market into leverage on Moscow’s war economy. Saqib’s assessment is that Trump’s use of a waiver gives the administration flexibility in dealing with Russia but makes the threat of those tariffs less convincing to other states.
For governments and firms deciding how closely to follow U.S. sanctions guidance, that credibility matters as much as the formal rules. If Washington signals that it is prepared to make exceptions for Russia under political or tactical pressure, decision‑makers in countries such as India, China or Gulf states may conclude they can seek similar treatment. That calculation makes it easier to deepen trade with Russian energy and commodity exporters even when the risk of penalties exists on paper.
The waiver also highlights a broader dilemma for any U.S. administration trying to constrain Russia while limiting disruption to energy markets and relations with key partners. Tariff‑based secondary sanctions can be blunt: enforcing them widely would hit not only Russian entities but also major importers in Asia and the developing world, complicating other policy goals. A president with waiver authority can dial that risk up or down case by case, but every such decision shapes how inevitable or negotiable future enforcement appears.
This debate plays out alongside other Western efforts to pressure Russia’s economy, including attempts to police an oil price cap, restrict the so‑called shadow fleet of tankers and tighten controls on high‑tech exports. The Graham Act’s tariff threat is meant to reinforce that wider pressure. If trading partners judge that Washington is already hesitating, they may treat other warnings more cautiously as well.
For Moscow, even the perception of a softer line helps. Russian officials can point to the waiver to reassure partners worried about secondary sanctions, arguing that the United States is reluctant to risk a broader economic confrontation. Existing U.S. and allied restrictions remain in place, but expectations about how aggressively new measures will be applied may shift.
Companies watching from the sidelines face a mixed picture: formal legal exposure to U.S. sanctions remains high, while the apparent willingness to grant waivers introduces uncertainty about how often the harshest tariff tools will be used. That could tempt some traders, refiners and logistics operators to probe the boundaries and see where enforcement lines are drawn in practice.
Signals to track now include any explanation from Trump or his team about criteria for granting future waivers, reactions from U.S. allies to any perceived softening, and changes in Russian export flows to major third‑country buyers. The first time Graham Act tariffs are imposed on a prominent non‑Russian target after this waiver, or withheld in a case where they might have applied, will give a clearer picture of how credible the mechanism remains.
Sources
- OSINT