Sana’a forces push offensive toward Taiz as Yemeni National Army suffers heavy losses around Marib and Jawf
On the 17th day of the offensive “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment,” Sana’a‑aligned forces say they have captured new positions near Taiz, while hostile reporting describes heavy losses for the Yemeni National Army in September–October fighting around Marib and Jawf.
The battle around Taiz and northern Yemen’s deserts is entering a new phase, with forces aligned to Sana’a claiming advances under their named operation “And Allah is More Severe in Power and More Severe in Punishment,” and their rivals reported to be taking significant losses in parallel fighting.
Accounts sympathetic to the Sana’a authorities say that on the seventeenth day of their offensive to capture Taiz, their forces took Jabal Dhahih Kahlan and the locality of Kahlan and then launched an assault on what they describe as the last positions of tribal forces besieged in Dabba and al‑Shaqab. These claims have not been independently verified, and the status of the units said to be encircled remains unclear from the available material.
At the same time, separate reporting critical of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and its allies dismisses what it calls fabricated news of Aden‑aligned advances from Marib toward Sanaa. It instead describes the Yemeni National Army (YNA) as having suffered heavy losses in personnel and equipment during fighting in September and October. Those clashes took place over hills in Jawf and in the Marib desert, and the attrition is said to be undermining the PLC camp’s ability to hold its positions.
Fighting in Jawf and Marib unfolds across difficult terrain where supply and medical evacuation are hard, so the reported loss of equipment and experienced fighters is not easily remedied. That in turn affects how much support can be diverted to fronts like Taiz, which has long been a focal point of both military and humanitarian pressure.
High ground around Taiz, including areas such as Jabal Dhahih Kahlan, Kahlan, Dabba, and al‑Shaqab, influences control over routes into and out of the city. If Sana’a‑aligned forces consolidate their position there, they gain added leverage over surrounding communities and over anti‑Houthi forces trying to maintain a foothold.
On the political side, the PLC’s dependence on a mix of tribal fighters, local militias, and YNA units amplifies the impact of reported YNA losses. Weakened regular formations make coordination more difficult and deepen reliance on groups with their own agendas.
The Sana’a authorities can present each reported gain in the Taiz offensive as proof of momentum. But the broader picture will be shaped by hard evidence: confirmed changes in control around the named areas, any acknowledgment from PLC or YNA commanders of the recent losses in Jawf and Marib, and the response of regional actors if the balance near Taiz continues to tilt.
Sources
- OSINT