Ukraine hits Russian missile‑fuel plant in Tver, targeting Kh‑101 supply chain
Ukrainian forces have struck the Experimental Redkino Plant in Russia’s Tver region, a facility that produces Decilin‑M fuel for Kh‑55 and Kh‑101 cruise missiles used in recent barrages. The attack shifts focus from launchers to the supply chain that keeps Russia’s long‑range strikes possible.
Ukraine is increasingly aiming not just at the missiles that hit its cities, but at the factories that make them possible. Ukrainian sources report that an overnight strike hit the Experimental Redkino Plant in Russia’s Tver region, which produces Decilin‑M — a specialized fuel for Kh‑55 and Kh‑101 cruise missiles.
The Redkino facility also manufactures additives and special fluids for Russia’s fuel complex, but its role in supplying propellant for long‑range cruise missiles makes it a particularly attractive target for Kyiv. Those same Kh‑101 missiles were used two days earlier in a major strike against the Ukrainian city of Pryluky, part of a broader Russian campaign against energy and civilian infrastructure.
The reported hit on Redkino sits alongside Zelensky’s confirmation of Ukrainian strikes on the Omsk and Ukhta refineries and a Russian data center, suggesting a coordinated effort to degrade Russia’s ability to produce, fuel and coordinate long‑range weapons. By reaching deep into Russia’s industrial rear, Ukraine is trying to lengthen the replacement cycle for missiles that have been raining down on its power plants and cities.
For Russian workers and local officials around Tver, an attack on a fuel‑production site is a jarring indicator that what looks like ordinary industry on the outside can be treated as a military target if it feeds into the war effort. Depending on the scale of damage, the strike could mean temporary evacuation, lost shifts, and safety concerns about fires or chemical releases.
From a military‑logistics perspective, cruise missile supply chains are only as resilient as their most specialized links. Warheads, guidance systems and airframes can be produced in multiple factories, but unique fuel blends like Decilin‑M are often concentrated in just a handful of plants. Disrupting one of those nodes can force Russia to draw down stockpiles, reconfigure production or accept limits on the number and frequency of large salvos.
For Ukraine’s defenders and civilians, every constrained Russian launch matters. Fewer Kh‑101 missiles available in the short term can reduce the intensity of attacks on power grids, substations and urban centers. Even if Russia compensates with other weapons, the loss of a preferred, long‑range precision system complicates planning and may lower the effectiveness of mixed salvos aimed at overwhelming air defenses.
At a strategic level, the strike underscores how Ukraine is adapting to a war of industrial attrition. Recognizing that it cannot match Russia missile for missile, Kyiv is focusing on high‑impact assets — refineries feeding the military, data centers supporting command and information operations, and now a key fuel plant for cruise missiles. The message is that Russia’s deep rear is no longer immune if it hosts critical war industries.
A line that captures the moment: when factories become as crucial as front‑line batteries, targeting decisions start to look like economic strategy as much as battlefield tactics.
The next developments to watch include any confirmation from Russian regional authorities on the extent of damage at Redkino, signs of changes in the tempo or composition of Russia’s missile strikes on Ukraine, and further Ukrainian disclosures about its ability to hit industrial targets at long range. Monitoring whether Russia can reroute Decilin‑M production or rely on alternatives will offer a window into how vulnerable its long‑range strike capacity is to repeated blows of this kind.
Sources
- OSINT