Published: · Region: Middle East · Category: markets

U.S. sanctions campaign squeezes Iran as rial hits record lows and Treasury warns foreign banks

Washington says its “Operation Economic Outcast” has driven Iran’s rial to record lows and pushed crude exports to zero, and the U.S. Treasury has now warned foreign banks over dealings with Tehran. The campaign deepens Iran’s economic pain even as suspected attacks near Hormuz and tensions over Gulf aviation keep the risk of a wider confrontation in play.

Washington is trying to choke Iran’s economy at the same moment tankers are being hit near Hormuz and Tehran is being accused—without public proof so far—of striking a commercial jet. The pressure is financial and kinetic at once.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said publicly that “Operation Economic Outcast,” the administration’s sanctions push against Iran, is delivering results. He asserted that Iran’s rial has fallen to record lows and claimed that the country “loaded zero crude oil onto tankers last month,” suggesting that Iranian seaborne exports had effectively ground to a halt in September. Bessent added that even Iran’s top security official has acknowledged the country is facing one of the most difficult periods in its history, although he did not quote that official directly in his comments.

In parallel, the Treasury issued a notice to foreign banks warning them over business with Iran. Such notices typically remind institutions that transactions involving designated Iranian entities can trigger U.S. secondary sanctions, even if the banks themselves are not American. The signal to compliance departments in Europe, Asia and the Gulf is clear: this is not a dormant sanctions program, and the political space for creative workarounds is shrinking.

If Bessent’s claim of “zero crude” loadings holds, the impact on Iran’s fiscal position is severe. Hydrocarbon exports remain Tehran’s most important source of hard currency. Even when sanctions were tighter in previous years, Iran moved significant volumes through gray‑market channels using ship‑to‑ship transfers, opaque ownership structures and rebranded cargoes. A month with no reported tanker loadings, whether because ships stayed in port or because trades shifted in ways not easily tracked, would mean less foreign currency coming in and more strain on a currency already under pressure.

For ordinary Iranians, the macroeconomic story translates into sharper price spikes for imported goods, cuts in public services and dwindling job prospects in sectors linked to trade. A collapsing rial erodes savings and salaries alike. The Treasury secretary’s line that “the Iranian regime allows its own people to suffer while it pours resources into terrorism” is a political judgment, but the economic hardship is real either way.

Sanctions are colliding with a more volatile security picture. Near the Strait of Hormuz, at least four vessels were reported hit within 24 hours, including a tanker whose engine room caught fire after being struck by an unknown projectile, according to the UK Maritime Trade Operations agency. Separate feeds described the projectile as likely Iranian, though no government has yet produced public evidence proving that.

Former President Donald Trump, speaking to reporters, said he personally believes Iran is responsible for the FlyDubai plane incident and claimed the United States is “bringing out record amounts of oil in the Hormuz Strait,” even as he acknowledged that Russian refineries being hit by attacks is a problem. U.S. officials have said no conclusive evidence linking Tehran to the FlyDubai incident has been made public so far.

The upshot is an Iran pressured from several directions: a currency at record lows, energy exports under tighter scrutiny, and growing suspicion that it is either directing or tolerating dangerous activity around a key maritime chokepoint and regional air routes. That combination increases the risk of policy overreach in Tehran, whether through more aggressive moves by partners such as the Houthis or through miscalculated responses at sea.

For energy markets, the picture is complicated. Officially, if Iran exported no oil in September, there is less immediate volume to lose in a crisis. In practice, traders have to assume some exports continue through less visible channels, and tanker attacks raise insurance costs and voyage risks for all Gulf producers, not just Iran.

The clearest takeaway for regional actors is that sanctions campaigns don’t just aim to change balance sheets; they change incentives for how a squeezed state uses its remaining levers of influence, including proxy forces and covert maritime operations.

Key developments to watch include any corroborated data on Iranian crude loadings from shipping trackers; currency moves in unofficial Iranian exchange markets; clearer attribution for the Hormuz incidents; and whether the Treasury follows its bank notice with specific enforcement actions against institutions seen as conduits for Iranian trade.

Sources