Houthis use hexacopter drones and Iranian‑linked bombs to hit tanks of Saudi‑backed forces in Yemen
Ansar Allah fighters used “Rajoum” hexacopter drones carrying Iranian DIO M48 high‑explosive and locally made bombs to strike main battle tanks and vehicles used by Saudi‑backed Presidential Leadership Council forces in Yemen, highlighting how cheap modified drones can threaten conventional armor.
Yemen’s war is shifting further toward low‑cost drone attacks as Houthi forces turn commercial‑style aircraft into precise weapons against Saudi‑backed armored units.
Conflict observers report that Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, used “Rajoum” hexacopter drones to hit main battle tanks and vehicles operated by Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) forces. The tanks are likely Saudi‑supplied M60A1s or similar models, according to weapons analysts who monitor equipment transfers and battlefield damage.
The Rajoum platforms resemble off‑the‑shelf multicopter drones adapted to carry and drop small bombs. In this case, the payload reportedly included Iranian Defense Industries Organization (DIO) M48 high‑explosive munitions, along with locally manufactured bombs. That mix of imported warheads and local production shows how outside support and field improvisation are combining on Yemen’s front lines.
For the tank crews and vehicle operators, these strikes change the calculus. Armor designed to withstand frontal fire or roadside bombs has limited protection against explosives dropped from above onto engine decks or turret roofs. Convoys on roads or units holding fixed positions become targets for relatively quiet drones flying at low altitude and guided by operators who can adjust their aim in real time.
The attacks also have tactical consequences for PLC forces that rely on armored vehicles to secure territory, support infantry and control supply routes. If hexacopter strikes grow more frequent or more accurate, commanders may have to disperse their armor, alter movement patterns or avoid operating at certain times of day, which can reduce their ability to advance or even hold key ground.
The reported use of Iranian‑made M48 bombs is likely to draw attention in Gulf capitals and Western governments that have long accused Iran of arming the Houthis. Identifiable Iranian ordnance on battlefield drones strengthens claims that Iranian materiel is reaching Yemen, even if assembly, targeting and launch are handled by Houthi units.
Relatively cheap drones paired with compact high‑explosive munitions give insurgent groups a way to threaten expensive, heavily armored systems that once symbolized coalition firepower. Damaging or destroying a single tank can ripple through a unit’s operations, affecting logistics, fire support and morale.
Developments to watch include whether PLC and Saudi forces deploy more counter‑drone systems, add improvised protective structures to vehicles, or adjust to more night operations. Any new public statements from Saudi Arabia on Iranian arms flows to Yemen, or visible changes in how regional air defenses monitor low‑flying small drones over front lines, would signal how seriously they take this evolving threat.
Sources
- OSINT