Sudan’s war tilts into drone conflict as Chinese-made systems hit army base and AKINCI downs RSF craft
Twenty-eight Chinese-made ARES-TMID-0014 attack drones supplied via the UAE to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces reportedly targeted an army base with no damage, while Sudan’s military says its AKINCI drone shot down an RSF-operated Chinese CH‑95 in a separate engagement over Al Kweki.
Sudan’s conflict is increasingly being fought in the air by foreign‑supplied drones, as both the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) lean on imported technology to strike each other.
In one reported incident, 28 kamikaze drones attacked a Sudanese Army base. The drones were identified as Chinese‑made ARES‑TMID‑0014 systems, classified as drone or surface‑to‑surface weapons with blast and fragmentation warheads. They were reportedly supplied by the United Arab Emirates to the RSF via Ethiopia. The same type has also been used by Yemen’s Houthis. Despite the size of the swarm, no damage was reported at the base.
In a separate engagement, described as an exclusive report, Sudan’s Army said its AKINCI drone shot down a Chinese‑made CH‑95 drone operated by the RSF. The shoot‑down took place in the Al Kweki area. The RSF is described in the material as a terror group backed by the UAE.
These two clashes show how Sudan’s skies have become crowded with foreign hardware: Chinese‑manufactured drones in RSF hands on one side, and a Turkish‑made AKINCI serving the national army on the other. The use of multiple ARES‑series kamikaze drones, in particular, highlights how relatively cheap systems can be deployed in large numbers to try to overwhelm defenses or send a political signal, even when they fail to cause physical damage.
The same ARES‑TMID‑0014 model turning up in both Sudan and Yemen suggests that regional suppliers are circulating similar toolkits across several conflicts. For people on the ground, that means a growing risk that bases, logistics hubs, and possibly civilian areas sit under the flight paths of systems designed to explode on impact.
What would alter this trajectory are decisions outside Sudan as much as inside it: any move by the UAE to curtail or expand RSF support; changes in Ethiopia’s role as a transit route; or efforts by other states or international bodies to limit the flow of combat drones and related equipment into the war. On the battlefield itself, further AKINCI air‑to‑air kills or larger RSF drone swarms would be practical signs that the drone duel is intensifying.
Sources
- OSINT