Saudi Outreach to Egypt and Indirect Israel Channel Shows How Houthi Threat Is Reshaping Ties
Under pressure from Houthi missile and drone attacks, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has flown to Egypt to seek military support and, according to diplomatic sources, is using U.S. Central Command to explore intelligence cooperation with Israel against the Yemeni group.
Escalating Houthi attacks are pushing Saudi Arabia to look for new partners, drawing Egypt and Israel more directly into the security conversation around Yemen and the Red Sea.
On 15 September, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman landed in Cairo, where he was welcomed by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi at the foot of his plane. Regional outlets, citing diplomatic sources, say the crown prince’s visit is part of a wider push to build a new coalition against the Houthis after earlier military support requests were reportedly rejected by Pakistan, Turkey and U.S. President Donald Trump.
Egypt is under pressure to decide how far it is willing to go in backing Saudi security priorities. Its economy is struggling, but its Red Sea coast and the Suez Canal give it a direct interest in stability along key shipping lanes that could be threatened by Houthi operations.
Diplomatic sources in the region also report that contacts are underway between Israel and Saudi Arabia via U.S. Central Command, focused on providing intelligence assistance to the kingdom against the Houthi threat. The reported goal is to help Riyadh prevent Houthi attacks that could endanger traffic around the Bab el‑Mandeb strait. Because Saudi Arabia and Israel do not have formal diplomatic relations, any such cooperation would run indirectly through CENTCOM.
These moves come as Houthi forces launch waves of missile and drone attacks on Saudi territory, including strikes toward cities such as Yanbu, Taif, Jeddah, Abha, Jazan and Al‑Ula, and as images circulate of fighting against Saudi‑backed forces in Yemen’s Al‑Jawf region. For Saudi leaders, the combination of cross‑border attacks and battlefield pressure is reinforcing the need for external military and intelligence support.
For Egypt, joining or supporting a Saudi‑led effort against the Houthis would mean balancing solidarity with a key Gulf partner against the risk and cost of being drawn more deeply into a long‑running conflict in Yemen. For Israel, indirect cooperation via CENTCOM would extend a pattern of quiet security coordination with Gulf states into a particularly sensitive theater.
The next indicators to watch are whether Cairo and Riyadh issue any joint statements pointing to specific forms of Egyptian support, whether CENTCOM publicly references expanded efforts to help Saudi Arabia counter Houthi attacks, and how the Houthis respond if they see signs of a broader coalition forming against them.
Sources
- OSINT