Saudi ‘ghost soldiers’ helped Houthis seize Red Sea coast, weakening Bab el-Mandeb security
An investigation into Saudi Arabia’s failed campaign on Yemen’s western coast found that some Saudi-backed units were up to 80% “ghost soldiers,” helping Houthi forces gain ground near the Bab el-Mandeb strait and putting Red Sea shipping at greater risk.
The security of one of the world’s most important sea lanes has been undercut not just by enemy fire, but by paper armies. A detailed investigation into Saudi Arabia’s failed campaign on Yemen’s western coast describes how units meant to guard the approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb strait were riddled with “ghost soldiers,” leaving Riyadh’s front lines hollow as Houthi forces advanced.
According to information shared with international media, the Saudi-backed formations deployed against the Houthis along the Red Sea coast and near the Bab el-Mandeb were, on paper, far larger than the fighters who actually turned up. In some areas now under Houthi control, as much as 80% of the soldiers listed on payrolls never existed in the field, replaced by names used to siphon off salaries and supplies. That meant outposts and defensive positions that looked robust on Riyadh’s spreadsheets were thinly manned, undertrained, and vulnerable when Houthi units pushed forward.
The immediate human cost has been borne by the real soldiers and local auxiliaries who did deploy. They faced offensives against positions that were supposed to have enough manpower and support but instead found themselves outnumbered or abandoned. As the Houthis overran areas once held by Saudi-aligned forces, civilians along Yemen’s western coastline were again caught between front lines, with ports, villages, and roads shifting hands under fire.
The strategic consequences radiate far beyond those hills and coastal strips. The Bab el-Mandeb strait links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, carrying a significant share of Europe–Asia container traffic and Middle East oil and gas shipments heading toward the Suez Canal. Effective control of the Yemeni coastline adjacent to that chokepoint gives the Houthis—already responsible for missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping—a stronger foothold to threaten passing vessels or negotiate from a position of strength.
For ship crews and logistics planners, the revelation that Saudi-backed defenses were so deeply compromised by corruption reinforces a hard lesson: the safety of a maritime corridor depends as much on governance and discipline on land as on warships at sea. A coalition that can’t reliably staff its own units can’t be counted on to secure radar sites, missile batteries, or coastal observation posts that help shield commercial traffic.
Riyadh’s struggle to hold ground against the Houthis has already forced global carriers to rethink routes through the Red Sea, with some diverting around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid missile and drone threats. The news that Saudi-led forces lost a critical coastal strip in part because most of their soldiers were fictitious further undermines confidence in the kingdom’s ability to stabilize the front. It also hands Iran, which backs the Houthis politically and militarily, another lever for shaping traffic through a chokepoint that matters to Europe, Asia, and the Gulf states alike.
A military built on ghost payrolls is a strategic vulnerability long before the first shot is fired. When those units are responsible for guarding a global chokepoint, the fraud translates directly into higher insurance premiums, rerouted ships, and a more fragile world economy.
The key indicators to watch next are whether Saudi Arabia restructures or replaces its local partners on Yemen’s western front, whether the Houthis consolidate control over additional stretches of coastline near Bab el-Mandeb, and how quickly major shipping lines adjust their routing assumptions. Any sign that Houthi forces are embedding more sensors, missiles, or drones along that shore will turn today’s governance scandal into tomorrow’s shipping crisis.
Sources
- OSINT