Ukraine Intelligence Chief Says Russia Weighs Major New Mobilization, Has War Resources Into 2028
Ukraine’s military intelligence chief says Russia is considering a large additional call‑up over 2026–27 and still has enough men and materiel to keep fighting into 2027 and 2028. He warns that only coordinated pressure with partners can drain those resources as Moscow intensifies strikes on Ukraine’s ammunition depots and weapons production.
Ukraine’s military intelligence service says Russia is preparing for a longer and larger war effort, with plans for a significant extra mobilization over the next two years and enough resources to keep fighting well into the second half of the decade.
The head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, Ivashchenko, said Russian commanders are considering calling up several hundred thousand additional personnel in 2026 and a similar number in 2027. His comments, made public on 7 September, frame Russia’s campaign not as a short‑term push but as a multi‑year military project that would deepen the human and economic burden on both sides.
Ivashchenko also said Russia’s resources for waging war against Ukraine remain sufficient and that he does not exclude these being enough to sustain operations in 2027 and 2028. He argued that depleting those resources will require joint work with Ukraine’s partners, signalling that Kyiv sees external sanctions, export controls, and continued military aid as central to shortening the conflict.
According to Ivashchenko, Russia’s main task now is to reduce Ukraine’s military potential and strike capabilities. He said Russian forces are focusing on attacks against ammunition storage sites and are trying to locate and hit facilities involved in the production of Ukrainian weapons. That shifts some of the risk away from the front line toward logistics hubs and industrial plants deeper inside Ukraine.
For Ukrainian forces already under pressure, the prospect of another large wave of Russian mobilization would widen the disparity in manpower. If paired with sustained artillery and drone production, it could allow Moscow to keep up pressure along a broad front while absorbing heavy losses. For Russian families, a further mass call‑up would mean more people pulled into a conflict that continues to expand in scale and duration.
Ivashchenko’s assessment is also aimed at foreign capitals. If Russia can keep its war machine running into the late 2020s, Ukraine’s ability to resist will depend less on a single offensive and more on whether Europe and other partners can maintain sanctions enforcement and keep supplying ammunition and air defences despite political turnover and domestic fatigue.
The core question is whether Russia can simply outlast Ukraine and its supporters. In that kind of contest, stockpiles, industrial capacity, and political will become as decisive as any tank or missile.
Signals to watch next include any formal Russian decree ordering a new mobilization wave, new multi‑year security or aid agreements for Ukraine, and concrete steps to further restrict Russia’s access to technology and revenue. Those decisions will shape whether the war moves toward negotiation or deeper attrition.
Sources
- OSINT