DRC Rebels Build Parallel Government in East After Taking Goma and Bukavu, Deepening State Fragmentation
After seizing Goma and Bukavu in 2025, the AFC/M23 coalition in eastern DR Congo has moved from battlefield gains to building a parallel administration in territory it controls. The shift puts millions of civilians under rebel-run structures and forces Kinshasa, neighbors and aid agencies to confront a de facto divided state in the Great Lakes region.
In eastern Congo’s largest cities, the question for many residents is no longer when the army will return, but how to live under a rebel government that is taking root in its place.
Since capturing Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu in February 2025, the AFC/M23 rebel coalition has gone beyond holding ground with guns. According to detailed regional reporting, the group is steadily building a parallel administration across areas it controls in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. That includes appointing officials and setting up structures designed to look and function like a state — in everything from local governance to basic services.
For civilians in these zones, the change is more than a change of uniforms at checkpoints. A parallel administration can decide who pays which taxes, which disputes are heard in whose courts, and how schools and health centers operate. Teachers, doctors, traders and farmers are pushed to navigate two sets of authorities: the internationally recognized government in Kinshasa and the on-the-ground power of AFC/M23. Aid organizations and local NGOs must decide whether to work with rebel-run institutions to reach people in need, or risk being shut out and leaving communities without support.
Operationally, the rebels’ shift from pure military occupation to governance marks a consolidation phase. By naming administrators and embedding themselves in local systems, AFC/M23 is betting it can outlast counteroffensives and international pressure. For the Congolese army and its allies, retaking territory now means unwinding networks of officials, tax collectors and security forces, not just dislodging fighters from positions.
The human cost of this fragmentation is subtle but relentless. Communities split along new lines of loyalty and fear; young people see their prospects tied to whichever authority can offer jobs, schooling and security. Business owners may be squeezed between rebel levies and national taxes, with little legal protection if they resist. Women and girls, already at extreme risk in a region scarred by sexual violence, face yet another layer of power holders with the capacity to abuse or protect.
Regionally, the emergence of a structured parallel administration in eastern DRC threatens to harden what has long been a fluid rebellion into a quasi-state actor. Neighboring countries that trade with or host refugees from Goma and Bukavu must now contend with border communities whose de facto rulers are not the Congolese state. That complicates everything from customs enforcement to security cooperation, and raises the risk that outsiders could see AFC/M23 as a negotiating partner rather than solely an insurgent force, a step Kinshasa vehemently opposes.
Strategically, the move deepens the DRC’s long-running crisis of state authority. A central government that cannot exercise effective control over two of its most important eastern cities looks weaker in the eyes of its citizens and its foreign partners. It also undermines investment and development projects that depend on predictable legal frameworks and security guarantees. For the wider Great Lakes region, a semi-institutionalized rebel enclave invites proxy contests and destabilizing flows of arms, minerals and fighters.
The shareable insight is stark: when rebels start appointing administrators instead of just commanders, they are betting the state has lost more than a battle — it has lost the habit of governing entire regions.
Key indicators to watch now include any formal response by Kinshasa to the rebel administrative structures, shifts in regional diplomacy as neighboring states calibrate their positions, changes in aid agency access and programming in rebel-held areas, and whether AFC/M23 moves from appointing local officials to issuing anything resembling its own regulations or identification documents.
Sources
- OSINT