Houthis Use New Hexacopter ‘Rajum’ Drones Against Saudi-Backed Forces in Yemen
Yemen’s Houthi movement has deployed hexacopter “Rajum” drones carrying mortar-style bombs against vehicles and positions of Saudi-backed forces, according to conflict monitors. The attacks deepen the group’s shift toward improvised airpower, raising risks for troops on the ground and for a region already uneasy about Houthi long-range strikes.
On Yemen’s battlefields, drones that once served mainly as surveillance tools are increasingly carrying explosive payloads. Recent footage and analysis indicate that Ansar Allah—the Houthi movement that controls much of northern Yemen—has used a hexacopter platform known as the “Rajum” to strike vehicles and positions belonging to Saudi-backed forces, arming the drones with mortar bombs and improvised munitions.
Conflict monitors who reviewed the material say the Rajum drones appear to be equipped with a mix of ordnance, including what may be Iranian M48 high-explosive mortar bombs alongside locally fabricated devices. The reported strikes targeted armored vehicles and troop concentrations on several fronts, although precise locations and casualty figures have not been independently verified. The attacks add a new layer to the Houthis’ well-documented arsenal of missiles and long-range one-way attack drones used against Saudi Arabia and international shipping.
For fighters on the ground, the growing use of such multicopter drones is a practical and psychological problem. Unlike larger, fixed-wing drones that can sometimes be tracked at a distance, hexacopters can hover, maneuver around terrain and drop munitions almost vertically onto trenches, vehicles or buildings. That forces soldiers to worry not just about what lies over the next ridge, but also about what might be circling above them, often with little warning beyond the buzz of rotors.
The operational impact is already visible in other conflict zones, where small drones have reshaped trench warfare and logistics. In Yemen, where front lines can be fluid and armored vehicles are crucial for moving along contested roads, the threat of overhead strikes complicates resupply, casualty evacuation and routine patrols. Crews may be forced to use camouflage, decoys, or to limit movement in daylight hours, all of which reduce their effectiveness against Houthi forces entrenched in key highlands and urban centers.
Strategically, the Rajum’s deployment underscores how the Houthis are embedding themselves in a wider ecosystem of Iranian-linked weapons development and transfer, even as they improvise with locally available materials. Suspected use of Iranian-origin mortar bombs suggests technical and logistical links that matter not just for Yemen’s internal war, but for Gulf states and Western navies concerned about the group’s ability to threaten ports, oil infrastructure and sea lanes.
The introduction of this kind of tactical attack drone also deepens the asymmetry of the conflict. Saudi-backed and internationally recognized Yemeni forces depend heavily on conventional hardware—armored vehicles, artillery, and airstrikes provided by allies—while the Houthis have invested in cheaper, harder-to-counter systems that can inflict disproportionate damage. For Riyadh and its partners, every new drone capability means more pressure to allocate air-defense assets, electronic warfare tools and training to front-line units that may already be stretched thin.
The broader pattern is that Yemen is becoming a testing ground for technologies and tactics that can migrate elsewhere. Techniques for mounting mortar bombs on small multicopters, programming their flight paths and integrating them into fire plans are likely to be shared, adapted and exported across networks that span from Iraq and Syria to the Red Sea. For regional militaries, the lesson is that air superiority in the traditional sense does not guarantee safety from cheap, expendable aircraft flown from a few kilometers away.
One line captures why this matters beyond Yemen’s borders: every improvised drone that successfully hits a vehicle or outpost teaches someone, somewhere, that airpower no longer belongs only to states. The spread of systems like the Rajum blurs the distinction between a rebel group and a proto-air force.
Key developments to watch include any confirmation from Saudi or Yemeni government sources about damage from Rajum strikes, evidence of countermeasures such as electronic jamming or dedicated anti-drone units on these fronts, and signs that similar multicopter platforms are being supplied or adapted for use by allied groups in other regional conflicts.
Sources
- OSINT