Iran Labels Foreign Persian-Language Broadcasters Military Targets, Raising Chilling New Risk for Journalists
Iran’s armed forces spokesman has said BBC Persian, Iran International and Radio Farda are in the military’s “target bank,” calling them soldiers of foreign intelligence services rather than media. The threat blurs the line between journalism and combatant and raises fresh concerns for exiled reporters, host-country governments, and the safety of media infrastructure.
When a government puts newsrooms into its “target bank,” the risk is no longer theoretical. Iran’s armed forces spokesman, General Abolfazl Shekarchi, has declared that several Persian‑language outlets broadcasting from abroad are considered part of Tehran’s military target set, describing them as extensions of Western intelligence services rather than legitimate media.
In remarks carried by Iranian outlets, Shekarchi named BBC Persian, Iran International, and Radio Farda as examples of networks he said were “directly connected to Mossad, the CIA, and enemy intelligence agencies.” He claimed they receive directives and support from foreign services and insisted that Iran’s armed forces do not regard them as media at all, but as “soldiers of the Zionists and America.” While he did not spell out concrete actions, explicitly placing such organizations in a “target bank” implies potential future operations against their staff or infrastructure.
For journalists and technical staff working for these outlets—many of whom operate from London, Washington, Prague, and other Western cities after fleeing harassment at home—the threat lands on top of existing campaigns of surveillance, harassment of relatives, and reported plots to kidnap or kill dissidents abroad. Turning a rhetorical campaign into a military classification raises the specter that cyber units, proxies, or other security organs could feel licensed to treat studios, bureaus, or even individuals as fair game.
The operational stakes extend beyond individual reporters. Host governments that grant licenses and protection to these outlets may now find themselves weighing upgraded security for offices, reviewing intelligence on potential threats, and signaling publicly that any attack would be treated as an attack on their own territory. Broadcasters must reassess physical and digital defenses—from studio access and travel protocols to network segmentation and backup transmission sites.
Strategically, Shekarchi’s statement fits a broader pattern in which Tehran frames information campaigns as a battlefield alongside conventional and cyber warfare. By collapsing the distinction between journalism and espionage, Iran is asserting a justification to retaliate against narratives it sees as hostile with tools normally reserved for state‑to‑state conflict. That framing is not unique—other governments have branded critical foreign media as foreign agents—but framing them explicitly as part of a military target bank is a sharper escalation in rhetoric.
For international media and press‑freedom advocates, the danger is that such language normalizes the idea that cameras and microphones are equivalent to weapons systems. In an environment where Iranian security services have already been linked by Western governments to plots against exiled activists and journalists, declaring foreign broadcasters as military targets makes those plans easier to sell internally and harder to deter.
The clearest takeaway is unsettling: when a state starts counting journalists like missiles, newsrooms become potential battlefields.
The key signals to watch now are whether Tehran’s language is echoed by other senior officials, whether there is an uptick in cyberattacks or physical intimidation toward the named outlets, and how quickly host governments move to respond publicly and quietly. The answers will show whether this is primarily a message meant to intimidate audiences and staff—or the opening of a more dangerous phase in Iran’s confrontation with foreign media.
Sources
- OSINT