Iran-Backed PMF Law in Iraq Tests U.S. Influence and Baghdad’s Sovereignty Balancing Act
Baghdad is preparing to send a long-delayed law formalizing the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces back to parliament, defying earlier U.S. opposition and sharpening the struggle over who controls Iraq’s guns and chains of command. The move could fold powerful militias more tightly into the state while deepening Tehran’s leverage over Iraq’s security architecture.
Iraq’s government is moving to revive a contentious law that would more firmly anchor the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces inside the country’s official security architecture, a step that could redraw the balance between Baghdad’s sovereignty, Tehran’s influence and Washington’s fading leverage.
On 22 August, Iraqi officials signaled that an amended PMF law will be sent to parliament for approval within two weeks, after the bill stalled since early 2025 due in part to U.S. opposition. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi supports the legislation, viewing the PMF as an integral component of Iraq’s armed forces rather than as a temporary wartime mobilization structure. PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyadh has publicly backed the push, framing it as overdue legal clarity for fighters who helped defeat ISIS.
For ordinary Iraqis, the stakes are immediate and local. The PMF’s constituent militias provide security, social services and sometimes jobs in many Shiite-majority areas, but they also face accusations of abuses, extortion and parallel chains of authority. Formal legal status could mean more regular salaries, clear ranks and potential accountability for some fighters, yet it could also entrench militia influence over neighborhoods, checkpoints and economic assets they already control on the ground.
Institutionally, the law would codify a security force with deep ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps into Iraq’s defense framework. That would make it harder for any future government to roll back the PMF’s role or disarm key factions without confronting both domestic powerbrokers and Tehran. It would also complicate efforts to build a cohesive national army and police force that answer solely to the central state, not to party or militia leaders.
For Washington, the renewed PMF law is a test of residual influence in Baghdad. U.S. officials have long pushed for the demobilization or at least significant restructuring of PMF units they see as too closely bound to Iranian interests, especially those involved in rocket and drone attacks on U.S. troops and diplomatic facilities. The bill’s revival after a year and a half of delay suggests that U.S. objections no longer carry the same weight they once did in Iraqi legislative calculus.
Regionally, the legislation plugs into a broader competition over Iraq’s alignment. Tehran has sought to institutionalize its gains by embedding allied armed groups into state structures across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Formalizing the PMF’s status would give Iran a more predictable, legal pathway to influence Iraqi security decisions—from base locations and border controls to responses during any future crisis involving Israel, the United States or Gulf allies.
At the same time, integrating the PMF is not purely a win for Tehran. Bringing disparate militias further under state law could, over time, make it easier for Baghdad to regulate budgets, weapons flows and deployments, provided the government is willing and able to enforce those rules. The risk is that legal status comes first, while effective oversight remains aspirational.
The core insight is this: Iraq is trying to turn a wartime coalition of militias into a permanent arm of the state, and in doing so is locking in a piece of Iran’s influence while betting it can still claim strategic autonomy.
What to watch next will be the precise wording of the amended law, including provisions on command authority, funding, discipline and the right to participate in politics. Parliamentary debate and voting patterns will reveal how much resistance exists within Iraq’s fractured political class. External reactions, particularly from Washington and Tehran, will help determine whether this becomes a quietly absorbed shift in Iraq’s security landscape or the next flashpoint in its struggle to balance competing patrons.
Sources
- OSINT