AES Alliance Deepens Sahel Power Shift, Loosening Europe’s Grip on West Africa
A Nigerien analyst says the Alliance of Sahel States has become a “major issue” for its members, who feel newly ‘liberated’ in their external partnerships three years after its creation. The comment underscores how the AES confederation is hardening into a geopolitical pivot away from traditional European security and economic influence in West Africa.
In West Africa’s Sahel, a loose security pact born out of coups and crisis is maturing into something more consequential for the region’s foreign alignments. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), grouping Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, is no longer just a military coordination mechanism; it is becoming a vehicle for redefining who these governments answer to — and who they ignore.
A Nigerien sociopolitical analyst, Mahamane Nourri, described the AES as a “major issue” for its member states, arguing that they have already achieved a great deal in the three years since the alliance’s formation. Commenting on a recent AES leaders’ summit on the confederation’s development plan for its second year, he said citizens can “feel very strongly” that their countries have been “liberated in relation to the partnership issue.”
That sense of liberation is aimed squarely at former colonial power France and, more broadly, at Western governments that had been deeply involved in security, development, and governance programs across the Sahel. Since successive military takeovers in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, the AES states have expelled French troops, curtailed cooperation with European missions, and sought new security and economic partners, particularly Russia and regional actors.
For ordinary people in these countries, the consequences are mixed and immediate. On one hand, the rhetoric of sovereignty and self-determination resonates in populations that have long viewed external interventions with suspicion. On the other, the withdrawal of Western military support and aid has coincided with persistent jihadist violence, economic strain, and humanitarian needs that alliances on paper cannot quickly resolve.
Operationally, the AES provides a framework for joint military operations, intelligence sharing, and border coordination among the three juntas, who face overlapping insurgencies and cross-border trafficking networks. It also serves as a political shield, allowing leaders to present a united front against regional sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and pressure from organizations such as ECOWAS, which has struggled to respond coherently to the coups.
Strategically, the alliance is part of a broader recalibration of power in the Sahel. By formalizing cooperation outside of ECOWAS and tightening relations with non-Western partners, the AES is narrowing Europe’s options for influence in a region once seen as a core zone of French and EU engagement. The shift also offers Russia an opening to deepen security and economic ties, including through state-linked private military contractors and resource deals, further complicating Western policy.
For Western capitals, the analyst’s comments are a reminder that sanctions and diplomatic pressure have not reversed the coups or dismantled the AES. Instead, they have arguably reinforced a narrative in Niamey, Bamako, and Ouagadougou that sovereignty is best defended by distancing from traditional partners, even at significant economic cost.
The enduring lesson is that in the Sahel, security vacuums are not just filled by more soldiers, but by new political stories about who is trusted to provide safety and respect. The AES has become the vehicle for one of those stories, positioning its members as co-authors of a new regional order rather than as subjects of external designs.
In the months ahead, key signs to watch include concrete steps to operationalize the AES confederation’s development plan, such as joint command structures or shared institutions, as well as any new formal agreements with non-Western security partners. How ECOWAS and the African Union choose to engage — through re-engagement, further isolation, or some hybrid — will reveal whether the AES is treated as a temporary aberration or a durable new pole in Sahelian politics.
Sources
- OSINT