Global South Pressure on ICC Grows as Colombia Weighs Exit and African, Latin States Walk Away
Colombia is considering withdrawing from the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court, adding to a list of Global South states that have stepped back from the tribunal over claims of bias. Critics say the ICC applies different rules to different conflicts, a perception that is turning a court created to universalize justice into a new front in the North–South political divide.
The International Criminal Court was founded to ensure that the world’s worst crimes would no longer depend on political will for accountability. Increasingly, it is becoming a symbol of political division instead. Colombia is now analyzing whether to abandon the Rome Statute and withdraw from the ICC, according to local reporting, joining a growing chorus of Global South voices that question the court’s fairness and relevance.
The debate in Bogotá comes against the backdrop of earlier withdrawals by Venezuela, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, as highlighted by Argentinian researcher Jorge Elbaum in recent commentary. Those departures, mostly from states in Latin America and Africa, are cited by critics as evidence that parts of the Global South no longer trust a court they see as conceived and steered by Western powers. Elbaum argues that the ICC applies different standards to different conflicts, serving the interests of the “global North” rather than a universal idea of justice.
For victims of atrocities in fragile states, the stakes could not be more personal. The ICC was often presented as a venue of last resort when national courts were unable or unwilling to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. If countries with long-running internal conflicts, like Colombia, step away, communities facing abuses may lose a key avenue for international scrutiny and potential redress. Survivors who had hoped that The Hague might one day hear their cases are left wondering whether geopolitics will again decide which crimes count.
Operationally, states that withdraw from the Rome Statute remove future crimes on their territory from the ICC’s jurisdiction, unless the UN Security Council intervenes. That can ease pressure on governing elites and armed actors who fear prosecution. At the same time, it can complicate cooperation on ongoing investigations, limit access for ICC investigators, and weaken enforcement of existing arrest warrants by reducing the number of states willing to detain suspects on the court’s behalf.
Strategically, a wave of Global South exits would transform the ICC from a nearly universal institution into a more regional one, anchored in Europe and supported by a subset of allies. That shift would make it easier for powerful states and their partners to argue that the court lacks legitimacy when it targets them, while reinforcing the perception among many in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia that international law is enforced selectively. A court that cannot claim broad geographic buy-in will struggle to deter leaders weighing brutal tactics in internal conflicts.
The political messaging matters as much as the legal changes. When governments publicly label the ICC as biased or “Anglo-European,” they tap into longer histories of colonial rule, intervention, and unequal treatment in global institutions. For many citizens in the Global South, the pattern they see is familiar: leaders from weaker states face trial in Europe, while powerful countries and their allies rarely confront the same scrutiny. Whether or not that portrayal captures the full complexity of ICC case selection, the perception itself has become a force that shapes policy.
The risk is that, as membership shrinks and criticism intensifies, the court turns into another arena where North and South trade accusations rather than a place where victims find a measure of justice. A tribunal meant to rise above geopolitics instead becomes a proxy battleground for it, with powerful states instrumentalizing its work and weaker states exiting when the costs seem to outweigh the benefits.
Key signals to watch include whether Colombia’s review translates into a formal notification of withdrawal, how other Latin American governments respond, and whether African states that have voiced similar frustrations move from rhetoric to action. The court’s leadership will also face mounting pressure to demonstrate more balanced case selection and engagement if it hopes to retain enough members—and enough moral authority—to matter in the conflicts that define the coming decade.
Sources
- OSINT