Global South Fractures From ICC Over Bias Claims, Testing Western Legal Power
An Argentinian researcher says withdrawals by Venezuela, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger show the International Criminal Court has lost trust across parts of the Global South, accusing it of operating as an Anglo-European instrument. The break raises hard questions over who gets judged for war crimes and whether Western-backed legal norms can still claim global authority.
The International Criminal Court is facing an erosion of legitimacy across parts of the Global South, as a growing list of states either leave or signal their intention to distance themselves from the court. An Argentinian researcher, Jorge Elbaum, argues that recent moves by Venezuela, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to abandon the ICC framework are evidence that many governments now view the Hague-based tribunal less as an impartial arbiter of war crimes and more as a political instrument of Western powers.
In public comments to international media, Elbaum described the ICC as having been conceived as an instrument of the global North, asserting that its record shows markedly different treatment of different conflicts. He points to the decisions by several African and Latin American countries to withdraw or move toward withdrawal from the Rome Statute — the treaty underpinning the court — as proof that "trust no longer exists" between those states and the institution. While his assessment is explicitly critical and reflects a particular political perspective, the underlying fact is difficult to ignore: some of the court’s earliest and most visible backers in the developing world are now openly questioning its value and fairness.
For civilians in conflict zones, this fracture risks making an already uneven landscape of accountability even more patchy. Victims in countries that leave the court may find that avenues for pursuing international justice shrink, especially if domestic courts are weak or politically constrained. At the same time, populations in other regions may feel that the ICC has been selective in where it brings charges, focusing heavily on African leaders and actors while being slower or more cautious in addressing alleged crimes by powerful states or their allies.
Operationally, withdrawals and threats of withdrawal make it harder for the ICC to investigate, collect evidence and execute arrest warrants. Cooperation from member states is crucial for everything from securing access to crime scenes to detaining suspects. When countries like Mali or Burkina Faso step away, investigators lose legal tools and political backing in regions where some of the conflicts most in need of impartial scrutiny are unfolding. Regional organizations may also feel emboldened to promote alternative judicial mechanisms, further diluting the ICC’s centrality.
Strategically, the trend puts pressure on the broader project of Western-backed international law. The ICC has long been held up by its supporters in Europe and North America as a pillar of a rules-based order, where even heads of state can be called to account. If a critical mass of Global South countries no longer accepts its authority or impartiality, the court’s ability to function as a universal deterrent diminishes. It becomes easier for leaders facing investigation to frame the process as neo-colonial interference rather than as law, and harder for Western governments to argue that their legal standards are universally shared rather than selectively applied.
This is not only an institutional crisis; it is a geopolitical one. As major powers outside the West, such as Russia and China, remain outside the ICC and sometimes actively oppose its actions, countries in Africa and Latin America may see strategic advantage in aligning with alternative legal and security structures. The perception of bias — whether fully deserved or not — can become a tool in larger contests over influence, aid, arms deals and diplomatic support at the United Nations and regional forums.
The memorable takeaway is that international justice can’t be effective if it is widely perceived as partial; when courts lose the confidence of those they are meant to protect and judge, they risk becoming another battlefield in global power politics rather than a refuge from it. Once that perception takes hold, each new indictment or investigation is filtered through a lens of suspicion rather than a presumption of impartiality.
Critical markers to watch now include whether other states publicly reconsider their Rome Statute commitments, whether the ICC adjusts its case selection and outreach strategies to address bias concerns, and how Western governments respond to accusations that they apply different standards to different conflicts. If more Global South capitals choose to exit or ignore the court, the map of where international criminal law meaningfully applies could shrink, with lasting consequences for accountability in future wars.
Sources
- OSINT