Syria’s New President Pushes Israel Security Pact as He Warns Against Being Trapped Between Tehran and Tel Aviv
Syria’s President Ahmad al‑Sharaa says Damascus is seeking a multi‑nation security arrangement with Israel while vowing not to be forced to choose between Iranian and Israeli ambitions. His comments mark a striking rhetorical shift for a state long defined by war with Israel and alliance with Tehran, and they matter for Lebanon, the Kurds, and Russia’s future bases alike.
Syria’s new president, Ahmad al‑Sharaa, has laid out an ambitious and unusually candid regional agenda, saying Damascus is working toward a security pact with Israel that would involve multiple nations, even as he insists Syria will not become a battlefield proxy for either Iran or Israel. In an extended interview broadcast by Al Jazeera on 26 July, al‑Sharaa described a country trying to pivot from isolation and conflict toward reconstruction and balanced diplomacy, while acknowledging deep internal and external constraints.
He said Syria aims to secure a “safety pact” with Israel, framed as part of a broader push for stability. While details remain vague and he acknowledged “obstacles” to any security agreement, including continued Israeli airstrikes on Syrian territory, the mere articulation of such a goal marks a significant rhetorical break from decades in which Damascus positioned itself as a front‑line state in permanent confrontation with Israel.
Al‑Sharaa stressed that Syria seeks to “avoid entering into confrontations with Israel,” calling such clashes “futile conflicts” that do not serve the interests of the Syrian people. At the same time, he reaffirmed support for the establishment of a Palestinian state and alignment with Arab consensus and binding international resolutions. That dual message — de‑escalation with Israel combined with formal backing for Palestinian statehood — positions Syria closer to the cautious normalization language heard in some Gulf capitals than to Iran’s openly confrontational line.
The president was explicit about Tehran, saying Syria should never be forced to choose between “Israeli ambitions and Iranian ambitions” and insisting that the region must develop its own independent policy and identity. He also noted that some senior figures in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps view the Arab Gulf as a weak flank they can rightfully claim, adding that Damascus does not share that view and considers the Gulf more resilient than these Iranian officers assume.
Domestically, al‑Sharaa pledged to address long‑standing grievances, particularly in Syria’s marginalized eastern regions. He said the previous regime had neglected areas rich in oil, agriculture, and human capital, pointing to the single‑lane road between Damascus and Deir Ezzor as emblematic of that neglect. He promised a new highway and noted that an investigation is underway into a recent accident on that route, presenting infrastructure and accountability as pillars of his reconstruction agenda.
On the Kurdish question, al‑Sharaa drew a clear line between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as an armed entity and the broader Kurdish population. He said a portion of the Kurdish community had been denied citizenship under the old regime, and that his government had issued a decree restoring that right. However, he acknowledged that implementation of an agreement with the SDF has been “slow,” even as he insisted Damascus remains committed to resolving it. Protests in Deir Ezzor over deteriorating living conditions underscore how quickly economic frustration can morph into political instability if promises remain unfulfilled.
Regionally, al‑Sharaa signaled a bid to repair alliances and attract investment. He described relations with Gulf states as “strong and strategic,” highlighted ongoing talks with Lebanon to help stabilize its crisis‑ridden economy, and praised a meeting in Damascus with a UAE delegation aimed at expanding cooperation. He also underscored Syria’s historical relationship with Russia, saying Moscow “rushed to turn a new page with us” and that discussions over the future of Russian bases on Syrian soil remain unresolved.
Sanctions remain a central grievance. Al‑Sharaa argued that lifting economic measures on Syria will not have full effect unless the country is removed from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list. He portrayed Syria as a natural commercial transit hub that was cut off from its surroundings by six decades of misrule, and now needs international legal and financial normalization to unlock its geography.
The shareable insight from his remarks is stark: Syria is trying to redraw its place on the regional chessboard from perpetual front line to guarded crossroads, but every promise — a safety pact with Israel, a new road to Deir Ezzor, a redefined relationship with Iran — will be tested not by speeches, but by strikes, protests, and investment flows. If Damascus fails to deliver, the vacuum could once again be filled by weapons and foreign agendas.
Key milestones to watch include any formal talks or third‑party mediation on Syria–Israel security understandings, practical steps on Kurdish citizenship and SDF integration, changes in the legal status of Russian bases, and whether Gulf and Emirati investment moves from memoranda to money on the ground. The trajectory of protests in eastern Syria will be an early indicator of whether al‑Sharaa’s promises are easing tensions or merely buying time.
Sources
- OSINT