Published: · Region: Middle East · Category: conflict

Arm of the Indian Ocean between Asia and Africa
Photo via Wikimedia Commons / Wikipedia: Red Sea

Houthis’ renewed attacks on Saudi tankers raise Red Sea chokepoint risk

Yemen’s Houthis say they hit two Saudi oil tankers and threaten Saudi infrastructure, while a separate projectile strike damaged a tanker off the kingdom’s Red Sea coast. With some ships already turning back from Bab el‑Mandeb, crews, insurers, and energy buyers are being forced to price in Red Sea transit as a contested zone again.

Oil tankers are once again being treated as fair game in the southern Red Sea, pulling one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors back toward active conflict. On 23 July, Yemen’s Houthi movement claimed it attacked two Saudi‑linked oil tankers with a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones, warning it could also target Saudi infrastructure if struck in return. Within the same 24‑hour window, a commercial tanker was hit by an unidentified projectile off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, according to a UK maritime alert, while multiple laden ships turned away from the Bab el‑Mandeb strait earlier in the week.

The Houthis identified the two targeted tankers as the ENCELIA and the LAYLA, describing them as Saudi oil carriers hit as part of what the group calls an expanded blockade on Saudi Arabia. The group said it used ballistic missiles, UAVs, and cruise missiles in the operation, though there has been no public confirmation from Riyadh of damage to those specific vessels. Separately, the UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported that a commercial tanker transiting off the Saudi Red Sea coast was struck on Wednesday by an unknown projectile, without detailing the flag or ownership of the ship.

At the same time, maritime tracking data cited by regional officials shows that three oil‑laden tankers en route to China and India turned back from the Bab el‑Mandeb on Tuesday. The reasons for those individual decisions have not been formally disclosed, but in practice tanker captains, shipowners, and insurers rarely need a formal blockade to alter course. A combination of specific threats, fresh claims of attacks, and at least one confirmed projectile strike is often enough to trigger route adjustments or temporary pauses in transit.

For crews aboard tankers threading the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the danger is no longer abstract. A single hit, even if it does not ignite a cargo fire, can tear open a hull, force an emergency port call, and send shockwaves through companies’ risk committees. For Yemeni coastal communities, renewed combat around the shipping lanes raises the prospect of oil spills, maritime search‑and‑rescue operations, and retaliatory strikes onshore if Saudi Arabia and its partners decide to answer with force.

Strategically, the Red Sea is a chokepoint twice over: it connects Gulf and Red Sea oil to Europe and the Mediterranean via Suez, and it offers Asian buyers a shorter route for Gulf crude. If enough shipowners decide the risk is too high, cargoes can be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at higher cost and longer transit times. That extra friction filters back into global markets through higher freight rates, tighter delivery windows, and greater volatility in forward contracts.

The timing compounds wider energy anxiety. Brent crude prices were already edging above $97 a barrel on 23 July amid escalating U.S.–Iran strikes and retaliatory fire across the region. For refiners in Europe and Asia, the combination of possible disruption near Hormuz and mounting risk in the Red Sea narrows the set of “safe” routes and suppliers. Even without a formal blockade, uncertainty itself becomes a cost driver.

For Riyadh, the Houthi statement that Saudi infrastructure could be targeted if the group is attacked presents a stark choice: absorb the hits and focus on defensive measures, or respond in a way that could pull Saudi oil facilities and ports back into the regional missile and drone crosshairs. For the Houthis, doubling down on maritime pressure raises their leverage but also risks inviting a more direct multinational response focused on degrading their strike capabilities along Yemen’s coast.

Bab el‑Mandeb risk does not need a full closure to matter—only enough fear to make ships, insurers, and governments hesitate. The key signals to watch now are whether confirmed damage emerges on the named tankers, whether more vessels divert or halt Red Sea transits, and whether Saudi Arabia or its partners conduct visible retaliatory operations against Houthi launch sites. A decision by major shipping alliances to re‑route en masse, or a significant spill from a damaged tanker, would mark a shift from episodic attacks to a sustained maritime crisis.

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