Drone and radar strikes expose new phase in Ukraine’s long‑range war on Russian air defenses
Ukraine says its drones and missiles have hit multiple Russian air defense and radar systems across Krasnodar Krai and occupied Zaporizhzhia, including Nebo and Tor units, in a coordinated overnight strike. The attacks reveal a deliberate effort to peel back Russia’s protective shield as Kyiv prepares its own long‑range missile assets.
Ukraine has opened a new line of pressure on Russia’s air defense network, announcing a series of coordinated strikes on radar and missile systems deep inside Russian territory and in occupied regions, while testing its own emerging long‑range weapons.
Ukrainian forces reported overnight attacks on at least eight elements of Russia’s air defense architecture. According to Ukrainian military statements, drones and precision munitions hit multiple radar systems and launchers across Russia’s Krasnodar Krai and Russian‑controlled parts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Listed targets included two Nebo‑SV radar installations, a Nebo‑U radar system, a Gammi‑S1M radar, a Kasta‑2E2 radar, a Tor‑M2 surface‑to‑air missile launcher, a Buk‑M1 launcher, and another unidentified radar unit.
Ukraine framed the operation as an effort to degrade Russian early‑warning and interception capabilities at “operational depth,” beyond the immediate front line. While Russia has not publicly confirmed the full list of destroyed or damaged assets, footage and local reports point to explosions and fires near several Russian air defense sites in the Krasnodar coastal region, an area crucial for protecting the approach to occupied Crimea and covering key military facilities along the Black Sea.
For Russian air defense crews, the strikes underscore that their radars and launchers are now prime targets, not just shields. Operators who once focused on shooting down incoming missiles and drones must also contend with being hunted by those same systems, forcing them to relocate more often, operate with tighter emissions control, and accept higher levels of personal and operational risk.
For Ukrainian pilots, drone operators and missile units, every radar blinded or launcher knocked out can open temporary corridors for deeper strikes on ammunition depots, command posts, and logistics hubs. Ukraine’s security services have already claimed a strike on an FSB coordination center in occupied Kherson, and mass drone raids on Moscow and other regions show how Kyiv is trying to stitch together tactical air defense suppression with strategic signaling inside Russia itself.
The campaign is unfolding as Ukraine continues testing a new family of domestically developed FP‑series missiles. Initial speculation suggested the FP‑7/9 might serve as a ballistic missile interceptor, but Ukrainian sources now say that with U.S. licensing for PAC‑2 and PAC‑3 Patriot interceptors in hand, the FP‑7/9 is more likely a ground‑based ballistic missile of Ukraine’s own. Earlier FP‑1 and FP‑2 systems have already been used against drones; a longer‑range ballistic capability would give Kyiv more options for hitting Russian targets far beyond current front lines.
Strategically, the shift matters because Russia’s advantage has long rested in part on dense, layered air defenses that complicate any attempt by Ukraine to use its limited stock of advanced missiles. If Kyiv can systematically poke holes in that shield with cheaper drones and homegrown weapons, Moscow will be forced to either concentrate defenses around a narrower set of high‑value areas or spread them thinner, accepting more risk everywhere.
This phase of the conflict turns sensors and interceptors into high‑value targets in their own right. A radar taken offline for days by a drone strike may be less visible than a destroyed warehouse, but it can quietly change what both sides believe is possible in the next round of attacks.
In the near term, the key questions are whether Russia begins redeploying air defense units away from the front to protect critical infrastructure, how quickly Ukraine can field and integrate its FP‑7/9 missiles, and whether the tempo of strikes on Russian radars and launchers increases to the point where large stretches of the front become more vulnerable to Ukrainian air and missile operations.
Sources
- OSINT