Iranian Missiles and Jamming Put Strait of Hormuz Back in the Crosshairs
Iran says it has hit U.S.-linked bases and long‑range radars in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, while heavy signal jamming and unconfirmed air‑defence activity are reported around the Strait of Hormuz and Abu Dhabi. For Gulf states and global shippers, the mix of ballistic fire and electronic disruption turns the world’s most critical energy chokepoint into a more uncertain place to sail and fly.
Oil tankers and commercial jets moving through the Gulf woke up on 13 July to a more crowded and confusing battlespace around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian forces claimed a fifth wave of missile and drone strikes against U.S.-linked infrastructure in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, as heavy signal jamming was reported in the narrow waterway itself and air defences were said to be active over Abu Dhabi.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it targeted U.S. military infrastructure in Juffair, Bahrain, including a drone command-and-control centre and a helicopter base, and that it struck Sheikh Isa Air Base. Bahraini authorities sounded sirens for a possible Iranian missile or drone attack, later issuing an all-clear and indicating that ballistic missiles appeared to be the principal threat in the area around Sheikh Isa. No detailed damage assessment has been officially confirmed.
In Oman, the IRGC announced it had destroyed long-range air-surveillance (FPS) and maritime radar sites with missiles or drones, claims that, if accurate, would directly affect monitoring of maritime traffic and airspace in approaches to Hormuz. This followed a separate IRGC statement that U.S. maritime surveillance radar on Omani territory had been struck for the second consecutive day, underscoring Tehran’s focus on the sensor systems that enable Western situational awareness around the chokepoint.
Kuwait and Jordan were also drawn more deeply into the exchange. The IRGC said it hit fuel tanks and a Patriot air-defence system at Ali Al Salem Air Base and an AN/FPS long-range radar at Ahmad Al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait. Iran’s regular army claimed joint drone strikes on U.S. air-defence installations, missile systems and support facilities in the country, though no Kuwaiti or U.S. authority has confirmed impacts there. Jordan’s military, for its part, said it intercepted four Iranian ballistic missiles launched during the attack sequence. But reporting from the region indicates that Iran fired at least 12 missiles toward Jordan, implying that a minimum of eight impacted Prince Hassan Air Base, an unusually high apparent impact rate against a well-defended target.
Further south, unconfirmed reports circulated of air-defence activity over Abu Dhabi, with at least two explosions heard across parts of the Emirati capital. The reports suggested the possibility that Iranian forces were aiming missile or drone fire at vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz, though there is no official confirmation of such targeting. Shortly beforehand, monitoring indicated heavy signal jamming in the strait itself, pointing to a contested electronic environment even as physical attacks drew public attention.
For civilians in Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and Jordan, the operational details translate into alarms, shelter orders and the risk that bases on the outskirts of their cities have become high-priority targets in a regional confrontation. For air crews transiting Gulf airspace and for captains on laden tankers or gas carriers, the degraded or disrupted signals in and around Hormuz raise practical concerns: GPS readings can become unreliable, communications with shore or military traffic control may be less stable and the lines between military and civilian flight or shipping corridors can blur in a crisis.
Strategically, Iran’s focus on long-range radars, maritime surveillance sites and U.S.-linked air bases suggests a deliberate attempt to chip away at the scaffolding behind American and allied power in the Gulf rather than just scoring symbolic hits. If radar coverage from Omani sites is reduced, and if Kuwaiti and Bahraini facilities are proven vulnerable, the U.S. and its partners face choices about dispersing assets, investing in hardened replacements or shifting some operations further from Iran’s missile reach — all of which carry political and operational costs.
The jamming around Hormuz is a reminder that control of the chokepoint is not only about ships and mines but also about who owns the electromagnetic spectrum. Tankers do not need to be sunk or seized for risk premia to rise; uncertainty about navigation, targeting and early warning can be enough to make insurers, charterers and captains reconsider routes, speeds and schedules.
The deeper pattern emerging over the past 48 hours is of Iran willing to send missiles across multiple borders and to combine kinetic and electronic tools in the immediate approaches to Hormuz, betting that calibrated pressure on U.S. assets and host nations will eventually shift diplomatic calculations. The United States is signalling in return that it will not confine its responses to Iranian proxies or coastal outposts.
The next phase will hinge on several visible markers: whether Gulf states publicly confirm damage to radar or air-defence infrastructure; any verified strike on or near international shipping in or around Hormuz; changes in reported GPS spoofing and jamming intensity; and adjustments to commercial shipping patterns or insurance terms through the strait. Those will show whether this week’s blasts and jamming represent a short, sharp exchange — or the early stages of a longer contest over who defines safety at the world’s most important energy chokepoint.
Sources
- OSINT