China’s manufacturing weight ‘tests survival’ of Europe’s factories, Greek PM warns
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis says Europe must take "important decisions" for the survival of its manufacturing base as China accounts for 30% of global production and 14% of global GDP. His comments capture the pressure European leaders feel to balance openness and protection as they confront a rival that dominates key supply chains.
Greece’s prime minister has put blunt words to a concern spreading across European capitals: that China’s industrial dominance is no longer just an economic challenge, but a question of survival for Europe’s own factories. Speaking on 9 July, Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that when looking at China’s scale in global manufacturing, "important decisions need to be taken when it comes to the survival of our manufacturing base in Europe."
Mitsotakis noted that China now accounts for roughly 30% of the world’s manufacturing capacity and about 14% of global economic output, figures that underscore how deeply Chinese production is woven into everything from consumer electronics to renewable energy hardware. He was careful to say he is not "in favor of protectionism per se," and acknowledged that many of Europe’s competitiveness problems are homegrown rather than made in Beijing. But he also stressed that Europe "cannot ignore" the sheer weight of Chinese industry.
For European workers and industrial regions, the debate is not abstract. Factories in sectors from steel to batteries and solar panels have watched Chinese competitors bring massive scale, heavy state support and lower input costs to global markets. The result has been job losses, plant closures and political backlash in parts of the bloc that once saw manufacturing as a stable path to middle-class life. When a sitting prime minister talks about survival, he is giving voice to fears in communities that see few alternatives if their industrial base erodes.
Companies are caught in the middle. European manufacturers rely on Chinese components and markets even as they complain of unfair competition from state-backed rivals. Tougher trade remedies, such as anti-dumping duties or tariffs on subsidized imports, can offer breathing space but also risk retaliation that closes off access to China’s huge consumer base. Mitsotakis’s ambivalence about protectionism reflects this bind: leaders want to shield key industries without provoking a trade war they cannot easily win.
Strategically, the concern goes beyond balance sheets. Europe’s ability to produce critical technologies at home—electric vehicles, advanced machinery, defense equipment, green transition infrastructure—is increasingly seen as a pillar of its geopolitical autonomy. An overdependence on Chinese manufacturing for these inputs would leave the bloc exposed to supply disruptions in a crisis or to political leverage in disputes over issues like Taiwan, human rights or digital security.
Energy transition policy is one of the front lines. Europe wants to decarbonize quickly, but the solar panels, batteries and electric buses that underpin its climate goals are often cheaper when sourced from China. Choosing between lower upfront costs and nurturing domestic capacity has become a recurring dilemma in Brussels and national capitals. Mitsotakis’s remarks add another voice to those arguing that ignoring China’s dominance comes with long-term strategic costs, even if it keeps consumer prices down in the short term.
A concise way to frame the stakes is this: if Europe outsources too much of its industrial muscle to China, it also outsources part of its political freedom of movement. Rebuilding or preserving manufacturing at home is not only about jobs, but about how much leverage Europe will have when the next geopolitical shock hits.
The next things to watch are whether more EU leaders echo Mitsotakis’s language as they debate new trade defense instruments, industrial subsidies and investment screening rules, and how Beijing responds to growing talk of "de-risking" in Europe. Any coordinated EU measures targeting Chinese exports in electric vehicles, green tech or strategic metals—along with any Chinese countermeasures—will show whether the survival debate is moving from speeches into a more contested economic relationship.
Sources
- OSINT