Trump’s Reported F‑35 Offer to Turkey Puts NATO Cohesion and Middle East Balances Under New Pressure
Donald Trump is expected to tell Turkey’s president during a visit to Ankara that he is willing to restore Ankara’s access to the F-35 fighter program, according to U.S. media, and reportedly traveled on a Qatari aircraft as he promotes jet sales to Turkey. The potential shift would reverse years of tension over Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles, with implications for NATO airpower, U.S.–Turkey relations and the regional balance from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean.
A fighter jet program once used to punish Turkey could be on its way back to Ankara, with ripple effects that stretch from NATO headquarters to the Gulf. The New York Times reported that Donald Trump is expected to tell Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a visit to Ankara that he is willing to allow Turkey renewed access to the F‑35 stealth aircraft program. Separate regional reports said Trump departed on a Qatari plane to promote F‑35 sales to Turkey, while sharply criticizing what he called undue Western hostility toward Qatar and Turkey’s ties to Islamist movements.
If realized, the move would mark a dramatic reversal from Washington’s 2019 decision to expel Turkey from the F‑35 program over its acquisition of Russian S‑400 air‑defense systems, which U.S. officials argued could compromise the jet’s secrets. At that time, the step was billed as both a sanction and a warning to other allies not to mix Russian high‑end kit with U.S. fifth‑generation aircraft. Reopening the door now would send a different message: that strategic imperatives and political relationships can override earlier red lines.
For Turkey, regaining access to the F‑35 would represent both a military upgrade and a political win. Ankara has been pursuing its own fifth‑generation project, the KAAN fighter, while also seeking to modernize its aging F‑16 fleet. F‑35s would dramatically enhance its ability to project airpower over the Aegean, eastern Mediterranean and potentially the Black Sea, affecting calculations in Greece, Cyprus and beyond. Turkish defense planners view such capabilities as vital not only for regional status but also for autonomy within NATO.
For ordinary Turks, the stakes are less about radar cross‑sections than about how military deals translate into economic and diplomatic leverage. A closer defense relationship with Washington can ease sanctions pressure, unlock investment and influence how Western banks view Turkey’s risk profile. It can also polarize domestic politics, where skepticism of U.S. intentions runs high and where some see deepening ties to Qatar and Islamist movements as a counterweight to Western pressure.
Within NATO, putting F‑35s back on the table for Turkey would test alliance cohesion. Some members, especially those wary of Ankara’s foreign policy in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, may question whether sensitive technology can be safely shared with a country that has maintained an arms relationship with Moscow and often charts an independent path on issues from Russia sanctions to engagement with Hamas. Others see Turkey as too important to alienate: it controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, fields one of NATO’s largest armies and hosts key alliance infrastructure.
Qatar’s reported role in ferrying Trump and hosting elements of the broader discussion underscores how Gulf states use high‑end arms deals to cement political alliances. Doha already hosts a major U.S. airbase and has invested heavily in Western defense equipment. Being seen as a facilitator for a potential F‑35 thaw between Washington and Ankara reinforces its position as a pivotal player between the West and political Islamist currents that many Western capitals view warily.
Strategically, the re‑entry of Turkey into the F‑35 club would alter regional balances. In the eastern Mediterranean, it would affect the airpower equation vis‑à‑vis Greece, which is itself acquiring advanced fighters. Around the Black Sea, Turkish F‑35s operating from bases nearer to Russia’s southern flank would add another layer to NATO’s deterrence architecture, even as Ankara maintains economic ties with Moscow and mediates on issues like grain exports.
The key insight is that advanced fighter jets are more than hardware; they are alignment choices cast in composite and software. Who flies F‑35s, and under what political conditions, signals which relationships Washington sees as indispensable. The signals to watch now include whether U.S. defense and State Department officials publicly confirm any change in Turkey’s status, how Congress reacts given its longstanding skepticism, and how Russia and Greece calibrate their own messaging and military planning if Ankara truly moves back toward the program.
Sources
- OSINT