# Ukraine Warns of Second Wave as Russia Holds Back Drones and Bombers

*Thursday, July 2, 2026 at 6:15 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-07-02T06:15:07.694Z (2h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Eastern Europe
**Importance**: 9/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/9609.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Even after a deadly missile and drone barrage on Kyiv, several Russian Tu‑95MS bombers and a stockpile of attack drones reportedly remain loaded and unused at key bases. Ukrainian monitoring points to a real risk of another large combined strike in the coming days, keeping cities, air defenses, and civilians on edge.

The overnight assault on Kyiv may not have been the peak of Russia’s strike campaign, Ukrainian monitoring suggests. Even as residents dig out from under rubble and firefighters battle blazes across the capital, Ukrainian assessments on 2 July warned of a credible threat of another large combined missile and drone attack in the coming days, pointing to Russian bombers and unmanned systems that did not launch during the latest barrage.

According to Ukrainian tracking of Russian airfields, between three and six Tu‑95MS strategic bombers remain on the ground at the Engels‑2 and Olenya air bases, still loaded with Kh‑101 cruise missiles. Those aircraft did not participate in the 2 July strike that hit Kyiv and other parts of Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian sources report a substantial reserve of Geran‑2 and Gerbera type attack drones that were also not used in the latest wave, despite extensive damage being inflicted with missiles alone.

Trajectory analysis of the 2 July assault indicates that Russia relied mainly on missiles, firing an estimated 74 across Ukraine, including roughly 30 Kh‑101 cruise missiles, about 24 Iskander‑M ballistic missiles, 12 Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, six Kalibr sea‑launched cruise missiles, and two Kh‑59/69 air‑launched weapons, based on preliminary Ukrainian data. Approximately 24 missiles were reportedly intercepted, with Ukraine claiming full interception of the Kalibr and Kh‑59/69 launches but none of the Zircons. The pattern suggests that while Ukraine’s layered air defenses remain capable, they are being stressed by mixed salvos that are hard to counter in full.

For civilians and city authorities, the immediate implication is that the sirens may soon sound again, and with less warning. A second wave launched from bombers still on standby and drone stockpiles held in reserve could be timed to exploit gaps exposed during the 2 July attack, or to target emergency services and repair crews working on already‑damaged infrastructure. The uncertainty of not knowing whether the latest strike was the main blow or a prelude is part of the pressure being applied to both the population and decision‑makers in Kyiv.

Operationally, holding back key capabilities allows Moscow to sequence its campaign. One possibility raised in Ukrainian assessments is that the missile‑heavy strike served as a reconnaissance‑in‑force, testing air defense positions and reaction times before a follow‑on attack using large numbers of drones. Another is that Russia is preserving its drone swarm for use when weather and other conditions are most favorable, or until it can synchronize them with fresh cruise missile launches from Tu‑95MS bombers. Any of those options would make use of the remaining arsenal that Ukrainian monitors say is still primed.

The stakes go beyond Kyiv. A renewed combined attack could target power infrastructure, rail junctions, fuel depots, and command nodes across the country, especially as Russia appears to be systematically hitting Ukraine’s ability to move and store fuel and ammunition. Even a limited repeat would force Ukraine to keep high‑end air defense systems positioned around major cities, potentially constraining how many can be pushed closer to front‑line areas under pressure in the east and south.

For partner governments watching from afar, the signal is that Russia’s long‑range strike capacity remains intact enough to generate multiple large salvos, even after months of high‑intensity use. The use of Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles, if confirmed at the reported scale, further complicates any Western effort to plug gaps with existing systems, given the difficulty of intercepting such weapons with current inventories. Air defense assistance is becoming less about filling empty shelves and more about keeping pace with an adversary that is mixing weapon types and timings to probe weak spots.

The most important indicators in the coming days will be satellite and open‑source observations of bomber activity at Engels‑2 and Olenya, signs of large drone concentrations being moved closer to launch points, and renewed spikes in air‑raid alerts across multiple Ukrainian regions at once. A sudden surge in takeoffs by Tu‑95MS aircraft or reports of mass drone launches from known staging areas would point to a second major wave in motion, and to a continuing effort by Russia to keep Ukraine’s cities and its air defenses under unrelenting psychological and operational strain.