# U.S. Signals Pending F‑35 and Engine Deal With Turkey, Reviving Alliance and Technology Risks

*Thursday, June 25, 2026 at 6:05 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-06-25T06:05:54.231Z (4h ago)
**Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Middle East
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/8689.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: President Trump has hinted he will soon approve the sale of F‑35 fighters and F‑110 jet engines to Turkey, while Vice President JD Vance says the deal is under review with conditions attached. The potential move could reset a strained NATO relationship and power Turkey’s next‑generation fighter program, but it would also put cutting‑edge U.S. technology back in President Erdogan’s hands.

Washington is edging toward a decision that could reshape both NATO’s internal balance and the future of Turkey’s air force: whether to green‑light the sale of F‑35 stealth fighters and advanced F‑110 jet engines to Ankara. President Donald Trump has publicly hinted that he intends to approve the package soon, while Vice President JD Vance has described a formal review process in which U.S. defense officials are weighing conditions for the transfer.

Trump’s comments suggest a political inclination to move past years of turbulence in the U.S.–Turkey defense relationship, which saw Ankara ejected from the F‑35 program after it bought Russia’s S‑400 air defense system. In parallel, Vance said that Defense Secretary Pete and his team are currently examining the proposed sale and that “several conditions” would need to be met before approval, without specifying what those conditions are. The dual messaging reflects both the strategic importance of Turkey within NATO and the deep concern in parts of Washington about sharing top‑tier military technology with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government.

The package under discussion goes beyond aircraft. Turkey is seeking F‑110 jet engines for its domestic fighter program — the KAAN project — which Ankara hopes will eventually replace some of its aging F‑16 fleet. F‑110 engines would give Turkish industry a critical boost in powering and maturing that platform. For Turkish engineers and defense workers, access to U.S. propulsion technology would mean a faster path to fielding a high‑performance indigenous fighter, rather than years of delay searching for alternative suppliers or developing a fully local solution from scratch.

For Turkey’s neighbors and NATO partners, the stakes lie in how Ankara might use and protect any new capabilities it receives. Supporters of the sale argue that re‑integrating Turkey into high‑end Western defense projects will keep its military more tightly bound to NATO standards and supply chains, reducing the temptation to turn again to Russia or China. Critics, including prominent conservative commentators in the U.S., warn that exporting America’s “best technology” to Erdogan risks further regional adventurism in the eastern Mediterranean, Syria or the South Caucasus, and increases the chance that sensitive systems could be exposed to non‑Western intelligence services.

Strategically, the decision sits at the intersection of two long‑running U.S. debates: how to treat an ally that often acts like a swing power, and how far to share its most advanced platforms beyond the closest partners. Turkey controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles, hosts key NATO assets, and plays a pivotal role in migration flows into Europe. At the same time, it has clashed with fellow NATO members Greece and France and conducted military operations in Syria and Iraq that have complicated U.S. objectives.

The potential approval also carries industrial and market implications. A revived F‑35 sale to Turkey would add another major customer to the program at a time when production lines are still ramping and partner countries are jockeying for delivery slots. The provision of F‑110 engines to power the KAAN would further entrench U.S. companies in Turkey’s defense ecosystem, creating long‑term maintenance, upgrade and export‑control relationships that will last well beyond this administration.

The broader lesson in this unfolding deal is that in modern alliances, the sharpest leverage is often embedded in who gets access to what technology and on what terms. Once a country’s air force is built around U.S. engines and avionics, the cost of breaking with Washington rises sharply — but so does the risk to the U.S. if that partner’s politics drift.

In the coming weeks, the clearest signals to watch will be whether the White House or Pentagon publicly spells out conditions for the sale, how Congress reacts to any formal notification of an export package, and whether Turkey moves on parallel issues important to Washington and other allies, such as overflight disputes with Greece or defense ties with Russia. The shape of any final deal — number of aircraft, scope of engine transfers, and safeguards on technology — will reveal how far the U.S. is prepared to go to keep Ankara anchored in the Western camp.
