# Europe’s Trust in the U.S. as an Ally Halves in Two Years, Poll Signals Strategic Drift *Wednesday, June 10, 2026 at 12:06 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-06-10T12:06:33.671Z (3h ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Global **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/6884.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: A new survey across 15 European countries finds only 11% now see the United States as an ally, down from 22% in late 2024 — a collapse in confidence just as Washington is locked in wars and great‑power competition. For NATO planners, defense industries and European voters, the numbers raise a hard question: what does transatlantic security look like when fewer Europeans actually trust America? Eleven percent is a small number. When it represents the share of Europeans who still see the United States as an ally, it becomes a warning light for a security system that has depended on transatlantic trust for three‑quarters of a century. A new poll conducted across 15 European countries and released on 10 June finds that only 11% of respondents now view the U.S. as an ally. That’s half the level recorded in late 2024, when 22% held that view. While details of the survey’s methodology and country‑by‑country breakdown are not yet public, the top‑line figure alone is striking: at a moment when the U.S. is waging a conflict with Iran, backing Ukraine against Russia, and locking horns with China, fewer Europeans are willing to describe Washington as an ally at all. For ordinary Europeans, this erosion of trust is not an abstract diplomatic issue; it influences how they feel about conscription debates, defense spending hikes and the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. Citizens in frontline states like Poland and the Baltic countries may still see U.S. troops as a core security guarantee, but growing skepticism elsewhere can shape elections, protest movements and the appetite for long‑term commitments. Families whose energy bills and mortgage rates have been whipsawed by war‑driven inflation may question whether alignment with Washington is paying off at home. Strategically, the poll lands at a delicate time. NATO is preparing for a summit in Ankara that Turkish President Erdogan wants to turn into a “landmark” in the alliance’s history. Trump has confirmed he will attend, even as he berates allies over spending, celebrates unilateral moves like the naval blockade of Iran, and sends mixed signals about the U.S. commitment to collective defense. European leaders must plan for supporting Ukraine over years, managing spillover from the Middle East, and hedging against Chinese pressure — all while significant portions of their publics no longer see the United States as a trustworthy partner. Defense planners and industries will read this sentiment as both a challenge and a mandate. On one hand, diminished public trust in the U.S. could limit political appetite for hosting new American bases, participating in risky operations, or buying U.S. equipment. On the other, it strengthens the argument for greater European “strategic autonomy”: more investment in continental air defenses, naval capacity, ammunition production and secure supply chains that do not depend on U.S. politics. The changing perception also affects deterrence. Moscow and Beijing track European public opinion closely. A Europe that appears less convinced of U.S. reliability may be seen as more susceptible to coercion or divide‑and‑rule tactics, from energy leverage to disinformation campaigns. Conversely, if European governments respond by deepening intra‑European defense cooperation and clarifying their own red lines, lower trust in Washington need not translate into a weaker overall posture. It matters, too, how Washington interprets these numbers. A U.S. leadership that sees falling favorability as evidence that Europe is ungrateful or soft may double down on pressure, threatening tariffs or troop withdrawals. One that views it as a warning may instead invest in more consistent policy, fewer unilateral surprises, and more visible consultation — from sanctions design to military deployments that directly affect European security. ## Key Takeaways - A new poll across 15 European countries finds only 11% of respondents now view the U.S. as an ally, down from 22% in late 2024. - The sharp drop in perceived U.S. reliability comes as Washington is deeply engaged in conflicts involving Iran and Ukraine and in strategic rivalry with China. - Public skepticism complicates European debates over defense spending, basing arrangements and long‑term alignment with U.S. policies. - For NATO and the EU, the numbers reinforce calls for greater European defense capabilities and resilience, even as they prepare for a major summit in Ankara. - Adversaries may interpret the trend as a sign of alliance weakness, while the U.S. response will shape whether the drift becomes a rupture. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the short term, expect European leaders to publicly reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic relationship while quietly accelerating initiatives that reduce reliance on U.S. political cycles — from joint ammunition procurement to new air‑defense projects and industrial subsidies. They will have to explain to skeptical voters why higher defense budgets are necessary even if trust in Washington is fading. For its part, the U.S. will confront a choice between treating the polling as a domestic talking point or as a strategic warning. More surprise sanctions, unilateral operations that affect European security, or erratic engagement in NATO will likely deepen the trust gap. More systematic consultation, shared decision‑making on conflicts like the Iran war, and visible support for European capacity‑building could begin to reverse it. The survey’s 11% is not destiny, but it is a reminder that alliances depend as much on public belief as on tanks and treaties.