# Sudan’s War Shifts as Army Gains Ground and RSF Turns to Drones, Leaving Civilians Trapped *Tuesday, June 9, 2026 at 6:17 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-06-09T06:17:56.259Z (4h ago) **Category**: conflict | **Region**: Africa **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/6739.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: A Sudanese crisis expert says the army is regaining initiative while RSF rebels increasingly deploy drones and scorched‑earth tactics in Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile. For communities already shattered by displacement and hunger, the shift means more destruction from above with little sign that either side is serious about peace. Sudan’s war is not winding down; it is mutating. As the national army claws back initiative on some fronts, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are leaning on destructive drone strikes and urban devastation, according to a Sudanese crisis expert. For civilians in Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region, the change offers no relief — only a different angle from which fire falls. Amin Ismail, a Sudanese analyst specializing in the country’s crisis, says recent fighting shows the army gaining operational ground while the RSF shifts tactics. In his assessment, violence has escalated in Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile as the RSF resorts to more indiscriminate drone use and scorched‑earth methods in response to setbacks. Both sides, he argues, remain focused on strengthening their positions rather than engaging in meaningful negotiations, even as talk of conflict resolution resurfaces in diplomatic circles. For families trapped in contested towns, these tactical shifts translate into immediate, daily terror. Drones overhead are harder for civilians to predict or flee than ground clashes; their strikes can hit markets, clinics, and makeshift shelters in seconds. Displaced people who once tried to avoid front‑line roads now face threats from above even in areas that feel temporarily quiet on the ground. In urban neighborhoods, RSF and army units trading fire through dense streets leave residents with brutal choices: stay and risk shelling and looting, or flee into camps where disease and hunger stalk overcrowded tents. Strategically, the reported army gains suggest a partial rebalancing after months in which the RSF appeared to hold momentum in parts of Khartoum and western Sudan. If the regular forces consolidate control over key transport corridors and provincial capitals, they may be able to restrict RSF resupply routes and limit the group’s ability to move heavy equipment. The RSF’s turn to drones and destructive tactics, in turn, reflects an effort to offset that by inflicting pain on areas under or near army control and to signal its continued relevance as a fighting force. But the logic of battlefield advantage is not translating into a political track. Ismail notes that each side views further fighting as a path to better negotiating terms, not as a reason to compromise. International attempts to broker talks — whether under African, Arab or Western auspices — have repeatedly stumbled on this reality: leaders in both camps calculate that concessions now would look like weakness, especially in front of hardline elements in their own ranks. For aid agencies and neighboring states, this is a worst‑of‑both‑worlds scenario. As drones and artillery reshape front lines, humanitarian corridors remain contested or blocked, and new displacement flows strain already thin resources in Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt. The use of cheap, commercially adapted drones for lethal purposes also raises fears that weapons and know‑how could spill across borders, feeding instability in a Sahel already riddled with armed groups. The wider geopolitical picture compounds the risk. Sudan’s conflict is entangled with competing regional interests — Gulf states wary of a failed state on the Red Sea, Egypt focused on Nile security, and external actors vying for influence and access to ports and resources. The army’s relative gains may embolden backers who see an opportunity to restore a more traditional state hierarchy in Khartoum, while the RSF’s resilience could encourage those betting on paramilitary leverage or fragmentation as a bargaining chip. If both sides keep prioritizing battlefield gains over negotiations, several trajectories emerge. An army push into RSF‑held urban areas could produce street‑to‑street battles with catastrophic civilian casualties. An RSF campaign of drone and rocket attacks on strategic towns might aim to make them ungovernable, undermining any claim the army has to effective control. Either path risks hardening ethnic and regional divisions that will outlast the current commanders. For ordinary Sudanese, the question has become brutally simple: who, if anyone, is still fighting to preserve a state that protects its citizens rather than its factions? Each new wave of violence in Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile makes it harder to imagine displaced families returning home or farmers planting in fields now seeded with unexploded ordnance and fear. ## Key Takeaways - A Sudanese crisis expert reports that Sudan’s national army is regaining initiative while RSF rebels rely increasingly on destructive drone strikes and scorched‑earth tactics. - Violence has escalated particularly in Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, with civilians facing intensified aerial and urban fighting. - Both the army and RSF are focused on strengthening battlefield positions rather than engaging seriously in negotiations, despite external calls for conflict resolution. - The shift to drone warfare raises risks for urban populations and neighboring countries concerned about the spread of weapons and instability. - Humanitarian access remains constrained as new displacement strains camps and host communities across Sudan’s borders. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the short term, unless a surprise diplomatic breakthrough occurs, the reported army gains are likely to encourage further offensives, while the RSF may double down on asymmetric tactics, including drones and targeted urban destruction. That trajectory points toward more localized collapses in governance and service delivery, especially in already battered regions like Darfur. Longer term, any sustainable settlement will require external actors to align pressure on both sides, not just shuttle between them. That likely means tougher conditionality on financial and military support from regional patrons and a more unified position from African and Arab organizations on accountability for atrocities. Without that, Sudan’s war risks settling into a grinding, multi‑front stalemate in which drones and militias, rather than institutions, become the main instruments of power — and civilians the permanent collateral.