# Iraq’s First Militia Disarmament Deal Tests Baghdad’s Grip on the Gun *Thursday, June 4, 2026 at 12:05 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-06-04T12:05:43.645Z (3h ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Middle East **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/6505.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: In Samarra, the powerful Saraya al‑Salam militia has handed its weapons to Iraqi forces, becoming the first Popular Mobilization faction to formally disarm under Prime Minister Ali Faleh al‑Zaidi’s integration campaign. For residents of Iraq’s Sunni heartland, PMF fighters, and regional powers alike, the move is a live experiment in whether Baghdad can finally pull rival guns into a single chain of command — or spark a backlash. For a country long defined by competing chains of command, seeing a major militia hand over its weapons to the state is less a photo opportunity than a stress test of whether Baghdad can really reclaim the monopoly on force. In the city of Samarra, Saraya al-Salam — one of Iraq’s best-known Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) factions — has turned in arms to the federal police and army, becoming the first PMF group to formally disarm under Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi’s new integration drive. Iraq’s Joint Operations Command, through deputy commander Qais al‑Muhammadawi, announced that a joint committee has overseen the process, confirming that Saraya al‑Salam fighters in Samarra have surrendered their weapons to state security forces. The move follows a May 27 directive from cleric Muqtada al‑Sadr, who ordered the separation of Saraya al‑Salam from his political movement and its integration into official security institutions. While details on the quantity and types of weapons handed over remain limited, the handover has been formalized enough for Baghdad to present it as a model for other PMF units. For civilians in Samarra and surrounding Sunni-majority areas, the change is felt in who mans the checkpoints and responds to incidents. Saraya al‑Salam’s presence has long been a double-edged sword: for some, a bulwark against jihadist return; for others, a symbol of sectarian imbalance and the blurring of lines between party, mosque and gun. Replacing militia-controlled positions with federal police and army units could create a sense of normalcy — a single uniform, a single flag — but it also raises fears that if the transition falters, security vacuums or turf wars could re-open old wounds. Strategically, the disarmament is an early proof-of-concept for al‑Zaidi’s stated goal of integrating PMF formations into the national chain of command. If Saraya al‑Salam’s transition holds, it strengthens Baghdad’s hand in three directions at once: vis-à-vis rival Shia factions reluctant to give up their own armed wings; toward Sunni communities that have demanded a clearer role for the national army; and in conversations with foreign partners wary of supporting a security sector riddled with parallel forces. It also matters for Tehran and Washington, both of which have treated PMF units as leverage — Iran through patronage and coordination, the US through sanctions and strike threats. The real test will come if and when Baghdad tries to extend this model to PMF factions more directly aligned with Iran, or to groups that have built deep commercial and political networks around their gunmen. Saraya al‑Salam’s loyalty to Muqtada al‑Sadr, who has repeatedly pivoted between confrontation and accommodation with the state, makes it a unique case. Other commanders may not be willing — or able — to instruct their men to surrender arms without clear guarantees on pay, legal status and political protection. If the integration campaign continues, several pressure points will become harder to ignore. Within the PMF, factions that feel singled out or threatened may resist by slowing compliance, mobilizing supporters in the streets, or using their influence in parliament to undermine the government. Within the regular security forces, commanders will have to manage the influx of ex‑militia fighters, balancing the need for their combat experience against concerns about discipline and allegiance. And for ordinary Iraqis, the key measure will be whether crime, extortion and arbitrary detentions recede — or simply rebrand under new uniforms. ## Key Takeaways - Saraya al‑Salam in Samarra has handed its weapons to Iraqi federal police and army units, the first PMF faction to do so under Prime Minister al‑Zaidi’s integration campaign. - The process follows Muqtada al‑Sadr’s May 27 order to separate Saraya al‑Salam from his political movement and fold it into official security institutions. - For residents of Samarra, the shift changes who controls checkpoints and policing, with hopes for more unified authority but fears of potential security gaps. - Strategically, the move tests Baghdad’s ability to bring powerful militias under a single chain of command and could influence Iran-aligned factions and foreign partners’ engagement. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the near term, Baghdad will likely showcase Saraya al‑Salam’s disarmament as evidence that its integration campaign is more than rhetoric. Expect follow-on announcements about vetting, retraining and redeploying former fighters into formal units, as well as quiet talks with other PMF leaders about replicating the Samarra model in their areas of influence. Success in maintaining security and discipline in Samarra will be used as leverage in those negotiations. However, the deeper political economy of Iraq’s armed groups will not change quickly. Militias tied to lucrative border crossings, construction contracts or local administrations will be reluctant to surrender the tools that secure those interests. If the government pushes too hard without compensatory arrangements, it risks provoking a backlash that could include street protests, parliamentary obstruction or even localized clashes between state units and holdout factions. Internationally, a visible reduction in militia autonomy could encourage greater support for Iraq’s security sector, including training and equipment that has often been withheld over concerns about PMF influence. If the process stalls or triggers instability, though, outside states may revert to dealing with armed groups as de facto authorities on the ground, undercutting Baghdad’s claim to be the sole arbiter of force. The Samarra handover is therefore less an end than the opening move in a long negotiation over who truly controls Iraq’s guns.