# EU Carbon Border Plan Sparks Backlash from African Development Bank *Thursday, May 28, 2026 at 10:04 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-05-28T10:04:48.459Z (3h ago) **Category**: markets | **Region**: Africa **Importance**: 6/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/5657.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: At the African Development Bank’s annual meetings in Brazzaville this week, AfDB chief economist Hanan Morsy criticized the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, saying African countries were not properly consulted. The comments on 28 May 2026 highlight growing tensions over climate trade policies and their impact on developing economies. ## Key Takeaways - On 28 May 2026, AfDB economist Hanan Morsy publicly criticized the EU’s implementation of its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) at meetings in Brazzaville. - Morsy argued that African countries were not adequately consulted or engaged and warned of negative impacts on African exporters. - The dispute underscores a widening rift between European climate policy ambitions and the development priorities of African states. - How the EU addresses these concerns will influence trade patterns, industrialization strategies, and North–South climate diplomacy. During the African Development Bank’s annual meetings in Brazzaville this week, Hanan Morsy, the AfDB’s director of macroeconomic policy and research, delivered a pointed critique of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Speaking on 28 May 2026, Morsy charged that African governments had not been properly consulted or engaged in the design and implementation of the EU’s new carbon border regime, which is now moving from transitional to operational phases. CBAM is intended to prevent “carbon leakage” by imposing levies on imports of carbon-intensive goods—such as steel, cement, fertilizers, and certain industrial products—equivalent to the carbon price that would be paid if those goods were produced under the EU’s emissions trading system. While Brussels frames the measure as a technical instrument to level the playing field and drive global decarbonization, many developing countries view it as a unilateral trade barrier that could penalize their industries and constrain their development pathways. Morsy’s intervention gives institutional voice to those concerns from a prominent African financial body. She argued that CBAM risks undermining export competitiveness for African producers who lack access to affordable low-carbon technologies and whose domestic carbon accounting systems may lag European standards. She also suggested that the EU did not engage in sufficient, genuine consultation with affected countries before moving ahead, raising questions about fairness and shared responsibility. The criticism comes at a time when African states are seeking to leverage their resource wealth—including hydrocarbons, minerals, and agricultural products—into industrialization and job creation. Parallel developments, such as Côte d’Ivoire’s $4 billion Phase 3 expansion of the Baleine oil field to reach 150,000 barrels per day, show that the continent’s energy and industrial strategies remain heavily linked to fossil fuels in the near term. For many African policymakers, CBAM appears as an external constraint imposed by wealthy countries that historically emitted far more and now seek to shift adjustment costs southward. From the EU’s perspective, failing to address carbon leakage could undermine its flagship Green Deal and emissions reduction targets. European officials have portrayed CBAM as compatible with World Trade Organization rules and open to dialogue with partners. Yet Morsy’s remarks underscore that dialogue has not convinced key stakeholders that their concerns are being incorporated into policy design. The dispute has broader geopolitical implications. Russia, China, and other major emerging economies have also criticized CBAM, albeit for different reasons. If African states coalesce around opposition to the mechanism, it could reshape alliances in climate diplomacy and trade negotiations. European attempts to frame itself as a partner in Africa’s green transition risk being undercut if its trade measures are widely perceived as protectionist. Economically, affected African exporters may face higher compliance costs, the need to invest in emissions monitoring and reporting, or the prospect of losing market share in Europe. Some may seek to redirect exports to less regulated markets, potentially slowing global decarbonization. Others may push for compensatory finance or technology transfer in exchange for adapting to CBAM requirements. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the immediate term, the EU is likely to face mounting pressure in multilateral forums and bilateral dialogues to soften the impact of CBAM on least-developed and lower-middle-income countries. Options include transitional exemptions, financial support for decarbonization, or capacity-building for carbon accounting. Whether Brussels is prepared to adjust the mechanism materially—or merely refine its communication—will be crucial. African governments, backed by institutions like the AfDB, are expected to coordinate positions more actively, potentially linking cooperation on migration, security, and raw materials to concessions on CBAM. They may also explore legal avenues in global trade bodies if they perceive the measure as discriminatory. For investors and firms, the evolving regime will influence where new industrial capacity is sited and how supply chains are structured. Analysts should track follow-on statements from EU climate and trade officials, as well as reactions from key African exporters in sectors directly covered by CBAM. The interplay between climate policy and development finance—especially support for low-carbon industrialization and energy access—will determine whether the mechanism becomes a catalyst for cooperation or a flashpoint in North–South relations. Morsy’s criticism signals that the current trajectory risks the latter unless engagement becomes more inclusive and responsive to African priorities.