Ukraine Hits Russian S-300/400 Radar With RAM-2X Kamikaze Drone
On 24 May, reports around 18:05–19:01 UTC indicated a Ukrainian RAM‑2X loitering munition destroyed a Russian 5N63S illumination and guidance radar component of an S‑300/400 air defense system on the eastern axis. The strike was attributed to Ukraine’s 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade and associated drone units.
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian 5N63S radar tied to S‑300/400 systems on 24 May.
- The strike, reported around 18:05–19:01 UTC, used a RAM‑2X kamikaze drone on the eastern axis.
- The radar is a critical command and illumination component in Russia’s layered air defense network.
- The operation highlights Ukraine’s growing capacity to suppress and degrade high‑value Russian air defenses.
- Loss of such systems could open localized air corridors and force costly Russian redeployments.
On 24 May, Ukrainian forces conducted a precision strike that destroyed a high‑value Russian radar associated with the S‑300/400 family of long‑range air defense systems. Reports published between 18:05 and 19:01 UTC describe how a Ukrainian RAM‑2X kamikaze drone, operated in conjunction with Ukraine’s 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade and associated aerial reconnaissance elements, successfully engaged a 5N63S illumination and guidance station located on the eastern axis of the front.
The 5N63S radar serves as a command and illumination hub within the S‑300/400 architecture, controlling missile guidance and contributing to the detection and engagement of aerial targets across substantial distances. Its destruction is therefore tactically significant: without this node, the associated air defense battery loses much of its ability to track and engage incoming threats. Such radars are both technically sophisticated and comparatively scarce, making them high‑payoff targets for Ukrainian planners.
The operation exemplifies Ukraine’s increasing use of loitering munitions and small, precise drones against Russia’s integrated air defense system (IADS). Rather than attempting to attrit large numbers of interceptors or launchers, Ukrainian forces are focusing on the command, control and sensor components that enable the broader network. By employing the RAM‑2X, a domestically produced kamikaze drone with sufficient range and payload to defeat point defenses, Ukrainian units can strike from standoff distances, reducing risk to crews and higher‑value platforms.
Key actors in this strike include the 15th Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade, whose role spans target acquisition, tracking and fire adjustment, and the specialized drone operators responsible for piloting the RAM‑2X munition onto the radar. On the Russian side, the affected S‑300/400 unit represents a segment of the broader air defense shield protecting frontline troops, logistics hubs and, potentially, deeper strategic assets.
This development matters because it undercuts Russia’s ability to maintain a dense and layered anti‑access environment over the front and rear areas. As Ukrainian forces systematically dismantle radar and command components, they can carve out localized windows in which manned aircraft, cruise missiles, or additional drones can operate with reduced risk. That, in turn, facilitates follow‑on strikes against logistics, command nodes and concentrations of equipment.
Regionally, sustained attrition of Russian air defenses will influence the airpower calculus along the eastern front and beyond. It could also pressure Russia to reallocate valuable long‑range systems from other theaters or strategic locations—such as deep inside Russia or in other neighboring regions—to patch vulnerabilities near the front. Such rebalancing may expose other areas and complicate Russia’s broader strategic posture.
Outlook & Way Forward
Going forward, Ukraine is likely to continue prioritizing Russian air defense radars, command posts and high‑end interceptors as targets for loitering munitions and precision artillery. Evidence of repeated successful strikes against these elements would indicate that Ukrainian suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities are maturing, potentially enabling more ambitious air operations in selected sectors.
Russia can be expected to adapt by hardening radar sites through improved camouflage, mobility, decoys and tighter integration with close‑range air defense and electronic warfare systems designed to disrupt incoming drones. The balance between Ukrainian strike innovation and Russian defensive adaptation will shape the air threat environment over the front. Analysts should monitor future reporting on radar losses, patterns of S‑300/400 redeployment, and any observable changes in Russian readiness or engagement behavior against Ukrainian aerial assets in the eastern theater.
Sources
- OSINT